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________________________________________________________________________ 
Access to transfers and credit, whether cash or in-kind, is a major source of 
poverty alleviation in many developing countries around the world.  For many poor 
households, these public and private gifts and loans make up a substantial portion of their 
yearly incomes and provide an important means to generate additional income.
1  Women 
may especially benefit from transfers and credit in countries such as Bangladesh where 
they often have few work alternatives.   
As such, the formal financial sector is currently one of the principle areas of 
intervention intended to provide social protection and poverty alleviation for the poor.  
The intervention has taken the form of formal transfers and improved access to credit 
and/or subsidization of credit.  In addition, the development community is increasingly 
interested in ways to create an enabling environment for the private sector, including 
banks, to provide the poor with improved access to financial services.  
The informal financial sector is also a key source of social protection,   
especially in areas with limited access to the formal financial sector.  In fact, in many 
countries, the informal sector is much larger than the formal sector.  The informal sector, 
which includes transactions such as gifts and loans from relatives, friends, and neighbors, 
may overcome barriers to the formal sector.  If this is so, formal programs designed to 
increase access to formal financial services may actually prompt reductions in the 
informal sector.   
In this report, we descriptively examine the formal and informal financial sectors 
of rural Bangladesh, placing a special emphasis on differences between men and women.  
Our analysis uses unique panel data on the credit and transfer behaviors of 1,800 
households in rural Bangladesh.  Throughout the analysis, we focus on five important 
questions:  (1) How important are the formal and informal financial sectors?  (2) What 
are the primary sources of gifts and loans within those sectors?  (3) Do men and women 
rely on different sources for finances (e.g. formal vs. informal) or different types of 
finances (e.g. gifts vs. loans)?  (4) How have the financial sectors evolved during the 
1990’s?  (5) What is the relationship between the formal and informal sectors?  The 
report is primarily descriptive.  However, we use causal regression analysis to further 
investigate the relationship between the formal and informal sectors and begin to answer 
the question: does the formal sector crowd out the informal sector and is this different for 
men and women?  
                                                 
1 For instance, in their analysis of the Philippines, Cox and Jimenez (1995) find that transfers accounted for 
nearly one-fifth of total household income for urban recipients in their sample.  
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Throughout the report, we pay particular attention to the gender of the recipients 
of both formal and informal finances.  Formal credit and transfers may alter the allocation 
of resources within the household.  Formal sector programs, such as microfinance, often 
target women with the intent, explicit or implicit, of altering allocations within the 
household.  It is not clear without recourse to the data that providing additional financial 
resources to women will have different effects on intra-household (and inter-household 
allocations) than providing those same resources to men.  Conceivably, male dominance 
in the household may permit them to capture all of the benefits of resources provided to 
any other household member.   
Formal credit and transfers may not only alter the allocation of resources within 
the household, they may also alter the allocation of resources between altruistically 
linked households.  Household that are recipients  of formal transfers and credit may 
transfer some of the benefits by increasing (decreasing) gifts and loans to (from) 
altruistically linked households, generating possible third-party effects.  In the most 
extreme case, formal sector programs could have no income effect on their targeted 
population if the formal sector fully replaces the informal sector.  Even in this extreme 
case of no income effect, programs may still have important impacts on broader measures 
of welfare such as women’s empowerment.  The sign of the relationship between the 
formal and informal sectors is indeterminate because assets acquired through formal 
sector programs may increase the credit-worthiness of households and thus lead to 
improved access to financial services from other sources.  As part of a larger project, the 
final section of this report begins to explore the relationship between the formal and 
informal sectors. 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows.  Section II discusses the 
relevant literature on transfers and credit.  Section III describes the dataset and provides 
important variable definitions.  Section IV presents descriptive results, and Section V 
presents regression results.  The final section summarizes important findings.  
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Section II.  Relevant Literature 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The current credit and transfer literature sheds light on the importance of the informal 
sector, why the relationship between informal and formal sectors is important, reasons for 
targeting women with transfers and credit, and why microfinance is an important form of formal 
credit.  This brief literature review also highlights current gaps in the literature and this report’s 
contributions. 
A.  The Importance of Informal Gifts and Loans 
The informal financial sector “act[s] like credit markets in helping households overcome 
borrowing constraints (e.g., Cox 1990), and can assist households in dealing with risk (e.g., Cox 
and Jimenez 1998, Morduch 1995, Townsend 1994).”  The World Development Report 
2000/2001 also emphasizes that households rely on both formal and informal strategies to 
manage risks (World Bank 2001, p. 140). 
There is a significant literature documenting the importance of informal transfers and 
credit in developing and developed countries alike.  Evidence from Ravallion and Dearden 
(1988) in Indonesia, Paulson (2000) in Thailand, Cox, Jimenez and Okrasa (1997) in Poland, 
Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998) in Peru, Cox (2002) in Vietnam, Zeller (1994) in Madagascar, 
Schoeni (1997) in the United States, and others demonstrates that households rely on the 
informal financial sector.   
The importance of informal gifts and loans varies by country, as shown in Table 1.  At 
the extremes: in the Philippines over 80 percent of households received informal gifts, while in 
Bulgaria 17 percent of households received informal gifts.  Poor households are more likely to 
receive informal transfers than wealthier households and these transactions represent a large 
share (up to 70 percent) of the income of the poor (Cox 2002, p. 13, World Bank 2001, p. 144).  
Also, fewer households send transfers than receive them (Table 1), suggesting that sending 
households may be supplying informal transfers to multiple recipient households. 
The literature provides limited evidence on the flow of informal transfers.  There is some 
evidence that informal transfers are more likely to flow to women, perhaps because women are 
more involved in the interfamily exchange of services or because women are more likely to 
outlive men and so receive financial help as widows (Cox and Jimenez 1992).  Cox (2002) finds 
that informal transfers are common and substantial in Vietnam, especially as a means of support 
for the elderly.  In general, transfers in Vietnam appear to flow from better off to worse off 
households (Cox, Fetzer and Jimenez 1998).  While gifts flow almost exclusively between 
relatives, loans do not (Cox 2002, p. 16).  
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TABLE 1 – Percentage of Households Participating in Informal Transfers and Credit 






3  Receiving or Sending
3
Zeller (1994, p.6)  Rural Madagascar (1992)  96 (loans)       
Cox and Jimenez (1995, Table 12-1)  Urban Philippines (1988)
  82 
    44 
   
Cox and Jimenez (1995, Table 12-1)  Rural Philippines (1988)
  89  50   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Jamaica (1997)  53  65  13.1   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Nepal (1996)  44.7  55.3  17.4   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Panama (1997)  37.8  40.9  15.5   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Peru (1994)  37.3  46.7  14.3   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Kyrgyz Republic (1996)  35.5  31.7  15.7   
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Kazakhstan (1996)  27.5  33.8  20.2   
Secondi (1997, p. 493)  Rural China (1988)
  26      
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Russian Federation (1997)  25.2  31.5  23.7   
Kochar (1997, p.342)  Rural North India (1981/82)  20 (loans)       
Khandker (1998, p. 114, 124)  Rural Bangladesh (1991/92)
  15 (gifts) 
17 (loans)      
World Bank (2001, Table 8.5)  Bulgaria (1995)  17  21.4  15   
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001, Table 5)  Rural India (1976-1984)        100 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001, Table 5)  Rural Pakistan (1985-1988)        84 
Cox (2002, p. 7)  Vietnam (1992/93)
      32.8 
Cox (2002, p. 13)  Vietnam (1997/98)        37.2 (gifts) 
52.4 (gifts & loans) 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001, Table 5)  Rural India (1968-1971)        8 
1 All sources surveyed respondents about transfers over a 1 year period with the exception of Madagascar (2 year period), The Russian   
        Federation (30 days), Kazakhstan (30 days), and India and Pakistan (3 year period). 
2 Analysis covers both urban and rural areas unless otherwise noted. 
3 Percentages refer to gifts unless otherwise noted 
4 Households in the lowest quintile of the per capita income distribution  
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B.  The Relationship Between the Formal and Informal Sectors 
The literature highlights crowding out as the principal reason for being interested in the 
relationship between the formal and informal sectors, though the relationship also is relevant for 
program impacts.  Knowledge of the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is 
relevant for researchers and policymakers interested in targeting program beneficiaries and 
measuring program impacts. 
Crowding out occurs when increases in access to formal transfers and credit results in 
reductions in informal transfers and credit, or vice versa.  Crowding out can have strong 
implications for targeting program beneficiaries.  As Cox and Jimenez (1990) explain, if private 
donors cut back their informal transfers and credit as public formal transfers and credit increase, 
the effect of public programs on beneficiaries would be less than originally intended.  If 
complete crowding out occurs, public programs would have no effect on targeted beneficiaries.  
With crowding out, some or all of the benefits of public formal transfer and credit programs 
would be shared with those who send private informal transfers and credit.   
The complete crowding out view is more theoretical than practical.  Even with complete 
income crowding out, programs may have important impacts on broader welfare measures.  For 
example, programs that target women, such as microcredit programs, will likely impact female 
empowerment even in the absence of income impacts and government transfers may be preferred 
by some recipients to private transfers.  Government transfers may also be more reliable and, in 
some cases, come with lower costs, such as less obligation to a more powerful relative or patron. 
The informal sector and the relationship between the formal and informal sectors are also 
relevant to evaluating program impacts.  As a result of crowding out, Cox and Jimenez (1990) 
suggest that examining only participating households may not adequately measure the full effects 
of public programs.  Some of these effects may be indirectly shared with non-participating 
households.  Morduch (1999)—in his literature synthesis on microfinance programs—states that 
“the extent of net impacts depends on the opportunities open to households in the absence of 
microfinance.  Households that do not participate in microfinance programs may have access to a 
wide range of informal financial mechanisms…” (p. 1597).  Given the importance of the 
relationship between the formal and informal financial sectors, what can the literature tell us 
about the relationship?  
Theory    
Theories on the relationship between the formal and informal financial sectors date back 
to the extensive literature on Ricardian equivalence started by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) 
who argue that private transfers motivated by altruism could render formal transfers, such as 
social security programs, completely ineffective; if motivated by altruism, formal transfers and 
credit may completely crowd out informal transfers and credit.  For example, if children care 
solely about their parents’ well-being (i.e., are motivated only by altruism) and provide them 
with $500 in informal transfers to ensure a constant income level, then a new formal program  
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that provides $250 in income to the parents (whether through formal transfers or credit) will 
reduce the informal transfers from the children by $250, because the program will now help 
maintain the parents’ constant income level.  If informal transfers and credit are not motivated by 
altruism, but instead are motivated by exchange (e.g., in return for childcare) or self-interest 
(e.g., in return for inheritance), there will not be complete crowding out (Cox 1987).   
Not surprisingly, given the importance of motivation for determining the outcome of 
formal transfer programs that redistribute income, a large literature subsequent to Becker (1974) 
and Barro (1974) examines motivations for transfers.  Motivations examined include altruism 
versus self-interest or exchange, and insurance (e.g., transfers received in response to a natural 
disaster).  The findings suggest no one clear motive for transfers.  McGarry and Schoeni 
(1995a,b) find support for altruism.  Lee, Parish and Willis (1994) and Secondi (1997) find 
support for altruism and some exchange.  Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) and Hayashi 
(1995) find evidence against pure altruism.  Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985), Cox 
(1987), Cox and Rank (1992) and Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1996, 1997) find support for 
exchange motives.  Knowles and Anker’s (1981) findings are inconclusive; they do not find any 
significant correlation between size of financial assistance received and recipient’s income.   
Lucas and Stark (1985), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), Miller and Paulson (1999), Paulson 
(2000), and Clarke and Wallsten (2003) all find some evidence of insurance motives.  McGarry 
(2000) concludes that our ability to distinguish empirically between altruistic and exchange 
behavior is severely limited. 
Other non-motivation based theories also indicate no one clear direction for the 
relationship between the formal and informal sectors.  These theories suggest that transfers may 
serve as a source of funds for those credit rationed (Cox and Jappelli 1990, Kochar 1997) or 
liquidity constrained (Cox 1990).   Also, the entry of a subsidized program may worsen the terms 
and availability of loans offered by moneylenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1998, Bose 1998, Jain 
1999).  While others describe cases in which increasing formal credit may improve availability 
in the informal sector (Floro and Ray 1997, Fuentes 1996).  “Borrowers may be simultaneously 
active in both informal and formal markets, either because they are unable to get all the credit 
they need from one sector alone, or because formal lenders might condition their lending on the 
borrower’s obtaining co-financing from other (presumably informal) sources” (Besley et al. 
2001, p. 6).  Empirical evidence is needed to sign the relationship between the formal and 
informal sectors. 
In summary, seminal theoretical work in the literature suggests that the relationship 
between the formal and informal financial sector depends on motives.  If transfers are 
altruistically motivated, then formal transfers may completely crowd out informal transfers.  Yet 
the literature examining motivations for transfers indicates that transfers are rarely motivated by 
pure altruism, suggesting we should not expect 100 percent crowding out.  What then is the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the informal and formal sector?  
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Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence of the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is sparse.  
The majority of the literature is descriptive and focuses on the relative importance of the formal 
and informal sectors.  The few studies that examine whether the formal sector crowds out the 
informal sector find some evidence of crowding out.  There is little or no examination of the role 
that gender places in financial sector use or the relationship between the formal and informal 
sectors.   
Descriptive empirical evidence on the relative importance of the formal and informal 
sectors is varied (Table 2).  In Nepal, Besley et al. (2001) find that 82 percent of lending takes 
place in the informal sector and 12 percent in the formal sector.  In Bangladesh, Khandker (1998) 
finds that the percentage of lending occurring in the informal sector dropped from 64 percent in 
1985 to 34 percent in 1991/92.  While in Vietnam, Cox (2002) finds that roughly one-third of 
lending takes place in the informal sector and two-thirds in the formal sector (p. 16).  Part of the 
variation is likely due to country, region, time period and samples, but also to inconsistent 
definitions of the formal and informal sectors.  For example, Cox (2002) defines loans from 
cooperatives and revolving credit organizations as formal, while Besley et al. (2001) and 
Khandker (1998) put them in a separate category.  Redefining all institutional loans (those listed 
in the Formal and Other categories of Table 2) as formal begins to reconcile the differences 
between Rural Bangladesh (1991/92) and Vietnam (1997/98), but not between these countries 
and Nepal (1995/96).  As a second example of differing definitions, Cox (2002) defines loans 
from moneylenders as formal or quasi-formal, while Besley et al. (2001) and Khandker (1998) 
consider them informal.  
The  World Development Report 2000/2001 further states that “informal and formal 
strategies are not independent: public policies and the availability of formal mechanisms heavily 
influence how extensively informal arrangements are used and which kinds are used” (World 
Bank 2001, p. 140).  Sinha and Matin (1998) find that participants in NGO-operated 
microfinance programs in Bangladesh are often also active borrowers in the informal sector (as 
cited in Besley et al. 2001, p. 7). 
Three studies we examine look at the effect of formal sector interventions on informal 
sector behavior.  All three find some evidence that formal sector interventions crowd out 
informal sector finances.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) find a small trade-off between 
government aid provided to young women in the form of welfare benefits and parental aid in the 
United States.  Cox and Jimenez (1995) run simulations using data from the Philippines and find 
that public transfers crowd out private transfers.  Interestingly, they find that crowding out may 
vary with the income of the targeted population.  Persons in the second quartiles of the income 
distribution may be less affected by crowding out than other groups.  Finally, Jensen (2003) finds 
that government old age pensions in South Africa crowd out private transfers.  Each rand of 
public pension leads to a 0.25-0.30 rand reduction in private transfers from children living away 
from home.  
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TABLE 2 – The Relative Importance of Informal and Formal Sectors 
     Percentage of Total Lending  Definitions 
Source    
Country and 
Year
1,2   Informal  Formal  Other  Informal   Formal  Other 
Besley, Jain, and 
Tsangarides (2001, p. 2) 
 Nepal  (1995/96)
 





 Commercial  and 
agricultural development 
banks 
 Grameen-type  banks, 
ROSCA-type, local 
groups, NGOs, relief, 
other 






























Cox (2002, p. 16)    Vietnam 
(1997/98) 
 
33 67    Relatives,  friends, 
and neighbors 
  Banks, gov't credit 
programs, cooperatives, 
revolving credit, or 
moneylenders 
  




52 48    Relatives,  friends, 
informal self-help 
groups, and other 
unregulated loans 
  NGOs, gov’t extensions of 
commercial and 
agricultural development 
banks, parastatal or private 
agribusiness firms 
  
Kochar (1997, p. 344)     Rural North 
India (1981/82) 
 




  Banks and government 
programs 
  
1 All sources surveyed respondents about transfers over a 1 year period, with the exception of Madagascar (2 year period) and Bangladesh 1991/92 (6 year period). 
2 Analysis covers both urban and rural areas unless otherwise noted. 
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C.  Reasons for Targeting Women with Transfers and Credit 
The literature highlights four key reasons for targeting women with transfers and credit: 
financial advantages, reaching a more vulnerable population, empowerment, and better program 
impacts. 
Lending to women appears to have financial advantages to lending to men (Morduch 
1999, p. 1583).  Women appear to have higher loan repayment rates (Khandker 1998, p.100).  
Women’s lower mobility may play a role in financial advantages if there is a fear that borrowers 
will default, move, and borrow in a new location (Morduch 1999, p. 1583).  Also, women may 
have fewer alternatives for borrowing and thus be less likely to default where defaulting results 
in loss of access to future, potentially larger loans—as is the case in the incentive schemes used 
by many microfinance programs. 
Since women have fewer alternatives for borrowing, they are a more vulnerable 
population and especially good candidates for formal credit programs.  The World Development 
Report 2000/2001 finds that “Microfinance programs have been especially important for women 
and households headed by women, who often have difficulty getting credit” (World Bank 2001, 
p. 156).  But if access to credit is the only reason to target women then, as Rashid and Townsend 
(1994) point out, why don’t men in the household borrow for women? 
Two additional reasons to target women are empowerment and better program impacts.  
The share of household market income earned by women is likely to enhance their bargaining 
power in the household vis-à-vis men.  Citing earlier research, Khandker (2003, p. 4) finds “that 
women do acquire assets of their own and exercise power in household decision-making.”   
However, there is some debate as to whether loans made to women remain in the control of 
women.  Estimates of the percent of female Grameen Bank borrowers that retain control over 
their loan range from 37 percent (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996) to 63 percent (Hashemi, Schuler 
and Riley 1996), as cited in Morduch (1999). 
Empowering women within the household can lead to better program impacts as a result 
of “maternal altruism”—women are presumed to desire smaller family sizes, greater investments 
in the health and schooling of children, and greater gender equality in intra-household allocation 
than men.
2  Increasing women’s bargaining power is likely to lead to resource allocations more 
in line with women’s desires.   
These gender differences are important.  Thomas (1997, p. 143) finds that placing more 
resources in the hands of women results in greater spending on human capital and nutrients and 
better child nutrition outcomes.  Earlier work with the data analyzed below—Pitt and Khandker 
(1998), Pitt, et al. (1999), Pitt, et al. (2003), Pitt (2001)—has found that the effects of program 
participation differ importantly by the gender of program participant.  For example, Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) find that the flow of consumption expenditure increases by 18 Taka for every 
                                                 
2 See Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods, and Policy by Haddad, 
Alderman, and Hoddinot (1997) for a survey of this literature.  
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100 Taka borrowed by women, but only by 11 Taka for every 100 Taka borrowed by men.  Pitt 
et al. (2003), using a totally different approach, find that credit provided women importantly 
improves measures of health and nutrition for both boys and girls, while credit provided men has 
no significant effect.  As Thomas (1997, p. 142) explains, rejection of the traditional unitary 
household model has strong implications for public policy.  It suggests, for example, that policies 
that provide more resources to women will have different effects on household choices than 
policies that provide resources to men.  Empirical evidence rejects the unitary model (Haddad, 
Alderman and Hoddinot 1997b).  Evidence that women use resources differently than men 
suggests that it is important to analyze the relationship between the formal and informal financial 
sectors by gender. 
D.  The Bangladeshi Context 
Gender differences are particularly important in the Bangladeshi context where men and 
women live within separate spheres.  Bangladesh is a traditional Muslim society where men 
yield disproportionate power, in part as a result of purdah.  Purdah is a complex set of norms that 
dictate a woman’s conduct toward her husband and other men.  Its practice in Bangladesh means 
that a woman avoids direct eye-contact with and speaks quietly in the presence of men, may 
cover her face when talking with men or senior relatives, rarely leaves the confines of her 
homestead, and if compelled to leave, avoids places frequented by men (Shehabuddin 1992), 
among other restrictions.   
As a result of purdah, women are less likely to be educated or work for a wage.  A 
woman’s primary destiny is to marry.  Once married, typically at a young age, a woman moves 
to her husband’s extended household in a village where she is a stranger.  If she bares sons, who 
can provide future income to the household, her low position within the extended household 
improves.  If she fails to produce sons, she faces the threat of desertion or divorce (Shehabuddin 
1992, 95).  Women’s work consists primarily of non-agricultural production that can be carried 
out at the homestead, housework, and childcare (Shehabuddin 1992, 61).  Without access to 
wage labor, a woman alone has few means to provide for her family.  Household income in rural 
areas comes largely from men and is roughly split between agricultural (subsistence and wages) 
and non-agricultural sources (World Bank 2002, 20).      
The four key reasons for targeting women with credit and transfers—financial advantage, 
reaching a vulnerable population, empowerment, and better program impacts—especially apply 
in Bangladesh.  Low mobility and little interaction with men mean Bangladeshi women have 
fewer alternatives for borrowing and thus potentially greater returns from borrowing and higher 
loan repayment rates, consequently providing financial advantage.  Little access to the wage 
labor market makes Bangladeshi women, especially those widowed or divorced, vulnerable.   
Purdah and women’s inability to bring income to the family mean that women have little 
power within the household, making Bangladeshi women especially good candidates for 
empowerment.  We know from the description of purdah’s practice in Bangladesh that women 
have little social power.  But what about economic power?  Economic decision-making is  
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subjective and difficult to measure.  However, empirical evidence from rural Bangladesh finds 
that roughly half of women respondents answer that they jointly decided on and implemented 
economic issues with their husband.  The other half answered that the couple decided jointly and 
the husband implemented alone, or the husband decided and implemented alone (Pitt, Khandker 
and Cartwright 2003, 8).   
Does it help to provide women with credit and transfers if women can’t fully control how 
they are used?  Recent evidence suggests that participating in microcredit programs increases 
women’s empowerment.  Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2003) find that credit program 
participation leads to women taking a greater role in household decision making, having greater 
access to financial and economic resources, having greater social networks, having greater 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands, and having greater freedom of mobility (p. 30).     
Credit provided to women in Bangladesh has been shown to have better impacts than 
credit provided to men, as cited in Section C above.  The gender differences may be especially 
strong with microcredit because purdah restricts women’s access to the wage labor market.   
Providing small loans to women enables them to undertake self-employment activities in the 
seclusion of their homes, thus providing paid income in a manner less culturally frowned upon.  
Microcredit programs thus provide a large change in paid income, moving women from the 
corner of essentially zero income to a positive amount.   
E.  Our Contributions to the Literature 
Based on the literature, we know that the importance of the informal financial sector 
varies by country, that the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is important, and 
that motives for transfers predict the relationship between the formal and informal sectors, yet 
motives appear to be mixed.  There is little empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
formal and informal sectors, especially by gender.  Gender is important because programs target 
women and often have different impacts when women participate than when men participate.   
This report will contribute to the literature by examining the role that the formal and 
informal financial sectors play for households in rural Bangladesh and how that role varies by 
gender.   It will also contribute to the literature by measuring the relationship between the formal 
and informal sectors by gender and whether formal microcredit (by gender) crowds out informal 
inter-household transfers.  
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Section III.  Data and Definitions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
A.  Data 
We empirically describe the formal and informal sectors in Bangladesh using panel data 
from the World Bank/Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies’ Credit Programs for the 
Poor survey.  The Credit Programs for the Poor survey includes panel data on approximately 
1,800 households from 87 villages in rural Bangladesh.
3  The first wave of the panel was 
collected in 1991/92 and the second wave in 1998/99.  The survey is well suited to analyzing the 
formal and informal financial sectors as it includes detailed information on money borrowed, 
lent, and transferred from many sources, and a wide variety of household characteristics. 
The survey is nationally representative of rural Bangladesh.  Rural Bangladesh is home to 
80 percent (101 million people) of the country’s population and 85 percent of the citizens living 
in poverty.  The rural poverty rate in 2000 was 53 percent with 37 percent living in extreme 
poverty (World Bank 2002, 4).  The typical household consisted of between five and six 
household members.  The majority of individuals in rural Bangladesh are illiterate (59 percent) 
and 54 percent of 11-19 year-olds have completed the 5
th grade (World Bank 2002, 12, 45).      
One drawback of the survey is its lack of information regarding transfers from formal 
institutions.  The Bangladeshi government transferred over $300 million in benefits during fiscal 
year 1999 (World Bank 2002, 67). Most of Bangladesh’s social safety net expenditures (95 
percent) go to targeted food transfer programs.  However, these food programs do not provide 
pure formal transfers.  Most of the food allocated through these programs (86 percent) is 
provided in return for work, education, or training.  The survey likely captures food for work as 
part of in-kind income from employment, but we are unable to separate the Food for Work 
transfers from other in-kind payments.  As the survey did not specifically ask about formal 
transfer program receipt, the Food for Education and food for training (Vulnerable Group 
Development) transfers likely went uncaptured.  Throughout the results, we briefly discuss how 
ignoring formal transfers might affect our conclusions.  Although the survey lacks details on 
participation in formal transfer programs, it does provide thorough information on formal 
lending and informal gifts and loans.  
The survey was designed for use in evaluating three flagship microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh: the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the Bangladesh Rural 
Development Board’s (BRDB) RD-12 program, and the Grameen Bank.  It was designed quasi-
experimentally to include both target (qualify to participate) and non-target (do not qualify to 
participate) households from both program and non-program villages.  This quasi-experimental 
aspect of the survey is important in our current and future work causally examining the 
relationship between formal credit from microcredit programs and informal transfers and credit.  
                                                 
3 The second wave of the survey includes a total of 104 villages.  Nine villages were added from thanas in the 
southeastern region of Bangladesh that was severely hit by a cyclone during the first wave.  Eight additional villages 
were added from thanas included in the first wave.   
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The survey sample design is choice-based: a stratified random sampling technique was used to 
over-sample households participating in one of the three credit programs and target non-
participating households.  Throughout the analysis we use weights, based on the population and 
sample distributions of households covered in the study villages, to weight the choice-based 
sample back to random sample proportions.
4 
 Wave 1:  Interviews for the first wave of the survey took place from December 1991 
through December 1992.  The wave 1 survey was conducted three times over the year at periods 
coinciding with the three cropping seasons in Bangladesh.  In the first round of the survey, 1,798 
households were interviewed.  In the second and third rounds, 1,778 and 1,769 of these 
households were re-interviewed respectively.  Households were asked about informal transfers 
over the past four months rather than the past year.  By combining the three rounds of data, we 
are able to measure informal transfers received and sent over the past year.  Though credit data 
(money borrowed and lent) are available over the past six years, we truncate the period to the 
past year in order to coincide with the transfer data.
5 
Wave 2:  Interviews for the second wave of the survey took place from February through 
October 1999.  The wave 2 survey was conducted once and asked about informal transfers over 
the past year.  Again, we restrict the available credit data to the same time period as the informal 
transfer data.  A total of 2,623 households were interviewed in wave 2 of the data.  These 
households include 1,667 original households from the first wave, 317 households that split off 
from original households, and 639 new households from both new and old villages.
6 A total of 
117 households that are included in our first wave analysis did not participate in the second wave 
of the survey.    
Three important contextual changes took place between the first and second survey 
waves.  First, there was substantial economic growth in Bangladesh.  The gross domestic product 
averaged 4.8 percent annual growth between 1990 and 1999, which amounts to a 52 percent 
increase in GDP over the time period (World Bank 2001).  At the same time, the rural poverty 
rate dropped from 61 percent in 1991/92 to 53 percent in 2000 (World Bank 2002).  Bangladesh 
also made substantial strides in school attendance, nutrition, and saw various improvements in 
health indicators.  
The second important contextual change between survey waves is that there was a 
significant rise in the number of microcredit organizations in rural Bangladesh, an increase that 
                                                 
4 The weights for the second wave of the survey are imperfect.  The population distribution of households is not 
available for the second wave and is estimated using the population distribution from the first wave. 
5 Khandker (1998) also uses the first wave of the World Banks/BIDS survey in his analysis of microcredit in 
Bangladesh.  Because Khandker’s focus is only on credit, he includes all six years of loan data, which leads to 
significant differences between estimates in his book and ones included in our descriptive analysis.  To effectively 
measure the importance of gifts versus loans, our focus, it is important to limit both to the same timeframe.     
6 Fourteen households in the second wave were included in the first wave but did not complete all three interviews.   
Thus, those households are not included in our analysis of the first wave but are part of the second wave study.  
Additionally, one household in the second wave is documented as being an original first wave household, however 
its identification number does not match any households in the first wave.  This leaves 1,652 households for which 
longitudinal data are available.   
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is well documented in the survey data.  Today Bangladesh has the largest operation of 
microcredit programs in the world, with about 12.4 million active borrowers and over 629 NGOs 
engaged in microcredit (World Bank 2003, 21).  Additionally, there was an increase in the size 
of several of the previously existing microcredit institutions.  For example, the Grameen Bank 
grew from 1.1 million members in 25,248 villages in 1991 to 2.4 million members in 39,706 
villages in 1999 (Grameen Bank 2004).   
The third important contextual change is that the second survey wave occurred during the 
massive 1998 flooding which greatly affected large areas of rural Bangladesh.  Without a doubt, 
the flooding affected the transfer and credit behavior of rural Bangladeshi families.  We note 
various implications of the flooding in more depth throughout the report. 
Attrition Bias:  The Credit Programs for the Poor survey was quite successful in keeping  
attrition of the sample to a very low level of 7.4 percent.  Econometric tests for attrition bias 
reported in Khandker and Pitt (2002) find scant evidence of any bias.  One test performed by 
Khandker and Pitt suggesting that attrition bias is not a significant issue with these data regressed 
outcome variables on household-level exogenous variables (among them age, sex and education 
of household head, maximum education of household males and household females, land 
ownership), a dummy variable indicating whether the household was not in the second round 
survey, and interactions of that attrition dummy and all the exogenous variables.  These findings 
are consistent with other studies on household attrition using U.S. and other data.  
Household-level Analysis:  We conduct the large majority of the analysis at the 
household-level for two primary reasons.  First, individual-level observations are not 
independent because only one member of a household may participate in several of the key 
formal credit sources in Bangladesh (e.g., Grameen Bank).  As a result, other household 
members would have zero probability of receiving formal credit.  Second, finances within gender 
in the household are likely fungible.  A formal loan given to one male (female) in the household 
may have a similar affect on private transfers as a formal loan given to another male (female).  
As the primary focus is between genders rather than within gender, we aggregate loans and 
transfers by gender within the household.  As a result, most gender-specific measures are also at 
the household level.  For example, formal loans to females would be the sum of all formal loans 
received by any female in the household.  Where noted, we do limited individual-level analysis 
to further examine the characteristics of recipients and sources of senders.   
Throughout the survey, the questionnaire asks for the person who was the “primary” 
recipient or sender of each gift or loan.  Our gender analysis is performed based on this response, 
however, gifts and loans may be shared by several individuals in the household.  While the 
majority of our analysis uses the gender of the primary sender and recipient as reported by the 
respondent, we do investigate whether the gender results are sensitive to this reporting.  These 
results are reported in our section on the Role of the Formal and Informal Sectors by Gender.    
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B.  Variable Definitions 
Below we briefly summarize important variable definitions and assumptions used in the 
study.  Throughout the analysis, data on gifts and loans, both formal and informal, are limited to 
the past year.  We broadly define formal gifts and loans as those from institutions and informal 
gifts and loans as those from individuals.  The specific sources for the formal and informal 
sectors are detailed below.  Because this is a multi-year analysis, we convert all monetary 
variables into real 1995 Taka using a Consumer Price Index for Bangladesh to allow for cross-
year comparisons (World Bank, World Development Indicators database).  While inflation has 
not been extremely high in Bangladesh, one Taka in 1991 is equivalent to roughly 1.38 Taka in 
1998.  In 1995, the average exchange rate was 40.278 Taka per U.S. dollar (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, International Trade Administration).  
Informal Transfers and Credit Sent and Received:  Gifts and loans from relatives, 
neighbors, friends, moneylenders, employers, landlords, and shopkeepers are defined to be from 
the informal sector.  Remittances sent from abroad are also considered informal transfers.  Our 
variables measuring the informal sector, also referred to as informal gifts and loans or transfers 
and credit, measure the cumulative amount of all gifts and loans received (or sent) during the 
past year.  These gifts and loans may include cash and the value of all food and other in-kind 
assistance.  While there is no minimum gift value, loans must be at least 1,000 (nominal) Taka to 
be included in the survey.
7   
Unlike formal transfers and credit, whether informal money received or sent is termed a 
gift or loan is subjective, especially when the money comes from a relative.  For example, when 
a parent gives money to a son it may be called a gift, but when the same parent gives money to a 
daughter it may be called a loan.  Even when money is given as a gift, the sender may expect to 
be repaid in-cash or in-kind.  Our descriptive results, as described below, highlight the fluid 
interpretation of gifts versus loans.  We analyze informal gifts and loans separately in the 
descriptive analysis.  In the regression analysis, where we more narrowly focus on inter-
household transfers, we combine gifts and loans from relatives because whether the amount 
received (or sent) is termed a gift or loan is fluid and open to interpretation.     
Informal Transfers and Credit Sent to and Received from Relatives and Non-Relatives.  
Gifts and loans sent to and from relatives are defined to be from the informal sector.  Relatives 
sending or receiving transfers may include parents, children, siblings, in-laws, and other relatives 
such as aunts, uncles, and cousins.  Transfers and credit from non-relatives may include friends, 
neighbors, moneylenders, employers, input suppliers, and shopkeepers.  Again, all gifts and 
loans must have occurred during the past year.  
Formal Sector/Formal Credit Received:  Loans from microcredit organizations, 
government institutions, commercial banks, cooperatives, and other NGOs are defined to be 
                                                 
7 A total of six loans less than 1,000 Tk. were included in the first wave of the survey.  However, the documentation 
cites that there is a 1,000 Tk. loan minimum, and thus we have removed those loans from our analysis.  This 1,000 
Tk. minimum may lead to a slight underestimate of total lending during the first wave since loans had to be 
relatively larger to be included in the 1991/92 survey than in the 1998/99 survey when accounting for inflation.  
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from the formal sector.  Our formal sector variables capture the cumulative amount of all loans 
(greater than or equal to 1,000 Tk.) received in the past year. 
Formal Program Credit and Total Microcredit:  Formal program credit captures the 
cumulative amount of all loans (greater than or equal to 1,000 Tk.) received in the past year from 
one of the three primary microcredit programs, BRAC, BRDB, and Grameen Bank.  Total 
microcredit includes this program credit as well as microcredit from the following additional 
sources: ASA, Proshika, GSS, Youth Development, and other NGO’s.  These additional 
microcredit sources were documented in wave 2 of the survey only (with the exception of the 
broad category other NGO’s in wave 1). 
Formal Government and Non-Government Credit:  Formal government credit captures 
all loans from government institutions such as the Krishi Bank and BSCIC as well as other 
government agencies.  Non-government credit is the cumulative amount of loans from all 
commercial banks and cooperatives.  The combined loans from these sources are referred to as 
other credit throughout the analysis.  
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Section IV.  Descriptive Results 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Households in rural Bangladesh rely on both the formal and informal financial sectors for 
access to money through transfers and credit.  These financial sectors are sizeable with nearly 
half of all households receiving a gift or loan in the past year.  In this section, we outline 
important characteristics about the formal and informal sectors, emphasizing gender-related 
differences and looking at the development of both sectors during the 1990’s. 
A.  The Relative Importance of the Formal and Informal Financial Sectors 
Descriptive results indicate that the informal sector was at least as important as the formal 
sector in Bangladesh during the 1998/99 time period (Table 3).  Slightly more households 
received money from the formal sector (29 percent) than from the informal sector (24 percent, 
not shown).  However, the average size of informal gifts and loans received was significantly 
larger than the average size of formal loan received, highlighting their relative importance.  Most 
of this difference was due to informal gifts, which averaged nearly three times the size of 
average formal loans.  However, the average informal loan value was also greater than the 
average formal loan value.  The informal sector (loans and gifts) accounted for 68 percent of the 
average total value of household loans and gifts received while the formal sector accounted for 
only 32 percent (Table 3).   
Though the survey does not include information on formal transfers received, we can 
roughly estimate that the average household likely received 700 Taka in formal transfers in 
1998/99.
8  According to the survey data, the average household received 2,125 Taka in formal 
loans, 1,440 Taka in informal loans, and 3,040 Taka in informal gifts.  Thus, formal transfers are 
not inconsequential, however they appear to be smaller than formal loans and informal gifts and 
loans.  Furthermore, including estimated formal transfers still leaves the informal sector larger 
than the formal sector (61 versus 39 percent).   
The limited international comparisons available suggest that fewer households 
participated in the informal sector in rural Bangladesh (24 percent) over the surveyed year than 
in most other countries (Table 1).  For example, 96 percent of households received informal 
loans over the past two years in Madagascar, 89 percent of households received informal 
transfers over the past year in rural Philippines, and 26 percent of households received informal  
                                                 
8 Using information from the Bangladesh Ministry of Finance, the total size of safety net programs was 19,878 
million Taka in the 2001-02 government budget.  Assuming that the aid is distributed based on the existence of 
poverty, roughly 85 percent of the aid should go to rural areas.  With a rural population of 101 million people, the 
average person would receive 167 Taka in formal transfers and the average household (with approximately 5.5 
people) would receive 920 Taka in aid.  Converting this value to 1995 Taka, we estimate that the average household 
received around 710 Taka in formal transfers.  This number may be slightly low for 1998/99 because of the 
increased formal transfers due to the flooding that ravaged much of Bangladesh.  However, at the same time, the 
estimate may be high because the budget is based on the costs of the program, which likely include considerable 
administrative costs.  All of these data come from Poverty in Bangladesh: Building on Progress published by the 
World Bank (2002, report number 24299-BD).  
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% of Total Gifts 












Informal Gifts  14.6  20,879  1878  100.0  46.1  346 
Relative Gifts  14.6  20,879  1878  100.0  46.1  346 
Spouse 2.7  31,840  4376  27.8  12.8  67 
Child 7.6  18,777  2564  46.9  21.6  177 
Parent 1.2  22,941  7793  8.7  4.0  29 
Sibling 1.7  16,547  5369  9.0  4.2  41 
In-law 0.9  11,356  7635  3.3  1.5  19 
Other 0.6  12,838  7294  2.4  1.1  13 
            
Informal Loans  12.7  11,339  2335  100.0  21.8  297 
Relative Loans  5.6  15,560  4455  60.5  13.2  127 
Parent 0.1  3,968  1311  0.2  0.0  4 
Child 0.1  16,848  8812  1.6  0.3  5 
Sibling 1.3  20,015  8680  17.8  3.9  26 
Mother/Father-in-law 1.0  27,592  10395  18.4  4.0  14 
Other Relative  4.2  7,833  1906  22.6  4.9  92 
Non-Relative Loans  8.6  6,563  1065  39.2  8.5  203 
Friends 1.4  4,551  1058  4.6  1.0  37 
Neighbors 3.4  4,538  858  10.7  2.3  81 
Moneylenders 2.4  5,444  1434  8.9  1.9  58 
Other Non-Relatives  2.4  8,569  3124  14.4  3.1  57 
            
Formal Loans  29.3  7,254  298  100.0  32.1  973 
All Microcredit  26.4  6,700  199  83.1  26.7  904 
Program Loans  18.3  7,521  250  64.7  20.8  684 
BRAC 5.0  4,920  293  11.6  3.7  158 
BRDB 1.7  6,209  714  5.0  1.6  56 
GB 12.0  8,508  323  48.1  15.5  488 
Other Microcredit  9.1  4,300  251  18.4  5.9  248 
Other Formal Loans  3.8  9,502  1728  17.0  5.5  96 
Government 1.8  7,904  740  6.9  2.2  49 
Non-Government 2.2  9,764  2593  10.2  3.3  53 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes:  Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  Columns may not add up due 
to rounding.  Please see text for detailed category definitions. 
1 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (in 1995 Taka) that a household received, for households with non-zero values.  
Average 1995 Tk./U.S. $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
2 Percentages are calculated based on the total value received (accounting for the percentage of households receiving and 
average amount received). 
3 n provides the unweighted number of households who received the specified gift or loan.  
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transfers over the past year in rural China.  This is interesting, given the relative importance of 
the informal sector in Bangladesh. 
Consistent with the literature, the descriptive results further indicate that households are 
more likely to receive than send informal gifts and loans.  The difference is especially large with 
respect to informal gifts; roughly 15 percent of households received informal gifts while only 
two percent sent them (Figure 1).  Households were also more likely to receive than send 
informal loans, though the receiving/sending gap was smaller for informal loans than gifts.  In 
addition, the average sizes of both informal gifts and loans sent were significantly smaller than 
the average sizes of those received (Figure 1).   
 
 
The difference between the overall size of gifts and loans sent and received is largely due 
to the rural sample population in the survey.  Figure 2 shows that households in this rural sample 
received the majority of their informal gifts in the form of remittances from abroad and from 
donors in urban areas of Bangladesh.  Rural gifts amounted to only three percent of the total 
value of informal gifts received compared with 71 percent from abroad and 24 percent from 
urban areas.  At the same time, there was not a single observation of a gift sent abroad, and the 
few gifts that were sent were split relatively evenly between rural and urban areas (not shown). 
This flow of informal transfers to rural areas from urban areas is not surprising.  Cox (2002)  also 
finds some evidence of this type of urban-rural informal sector relationship in his study of 
Vietnam.  
The flooding that occurred during the year of the survey may have also lead to increased 
gifts and loans received and decreased gifts and loans sent.  Compared with the 1991/92 survey, 
informal gifts and loans sent dropped significantly in 1998/99.  However, informal gifts and 
loans sent were substantially lower than those received in both survey waves.  Because so few 
households sent informal gifts and loans in rural Bangladesh, we focus almost entirely on gifts 



























Sent Received Sent Received
Loans Gifts
Mean Amount (1995 Taka)
Figure 1. Informal Gifts and Loans Sent and Received, 1998/99
Source: Authors' weighted tabulation from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh 
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B. Household and Individual Characteristics of Recipients
9 
Household Characteristics:  Surprisingly, there are few differences between the average 
demographic characteristics of households who do (recipient) and do not (non-recipient) receive 
any type of gifts or loans (Table 4).  Differences only begin to emerge when we look at the 
specific types of gifts or loans received, however even these differences are fewer and smaller 
than might be expected.  Households receiving informal loans have higher incomes (25,583 Tk.) 
on average than non-recipients (22,620 Tk.) and recipients of other types of loans or gifts.   
Households receiving informal gifts tend to be lower-income, more likely to be female headed, 
without a spouse, older, and more educated, on average.  
The demographic similarities between recipient and non-recipient households and 
average income differences between households receiving informal gifts and households 
receiving informal loans are further confirmed in Table 5, which shows the share of gifts and 
loans received by income quintile.  While non-recipient households were spread relatively 
evenly through all income quintiles, over half (57 percent) of all households that received 
informal gifts were in the bottom two income quintiles, and half of all households that received 
informal loans were in the top two income quintiles.  Table 5 also appears to partially confirm a 
                                                 
9 As cell sizes get small in our analysis of household and individual characteristics, our ability to detect statistically 
significant differences becomes weak.  Many of the differences discussed in this section are not statistically 
significant. 
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Figure 2. Informal Gifts by Location of Source, 1998/99
Source: Authors' weighted tabulation from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
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common criticism of microcredit: that it does not reach the poorest of the poor.  Households in 
the top two income quintiles were the most likely to receive microcredit loans while households 
in the bottom quintile were the least likely to receive them.  Still, Table 5 confirms that 
households from all quintiles of the income distribution are formal sector recipients, informal 
sector recipients, and non-recipients. 
 
TABLE 4 - Characteristics of Loan or Gift Recipient and Non-Recipient Households by Gender, 1998/99 





Any type of 







Male or Female Recipient          
Percent Male Head  88.9%  87.9%  89.8%  90.2%  77.9% 
Percent No Spouse Present  15.3%  13.6%  11.1%  12.6%  23.9% 
Mean Pre-Transfer Income (1995 Taka)  22,620  22,468  22,671  25,583  19,839 
Mean Age of Head  44.9  46.7  44.9  46.1  52.9 
Mean Education of Head  2.5  2.6  2.2  3.0  3.3 
Mean Max Age of Females  40.9  43.4  41.5  42.9  49.5 
Mean Max Age of Males  42.0  44.1  42.6  44.7  47.6 
Mean Max Education of Females  2.6  2.9  2.3  3.3  4.3 
Mean Max Education of Males  3.8  4.5  3.7  5.4  6.4 
Mean Household Size  5.0  5.5  5.3  6.1  5.8 
Observations
1 1245  1378  973  297  346 
          
Female Recipient          
Percent Male Head  91.0%  82.2%  88.2%  75.1%  48.1% 
Percent No Spouse Present  13.1%  17.8%  12.9%  32.1%  46.8% 
Mean Pre-Transfer Income (1995 Taka)  22,474  22,724  23,225  29,664  17,976 
Mean Age of Head  46.2  44.7  44.6  45.0  45.6 
Mean Education of Head  2.7  2.1  1.9  2.7  3.1 
Mean Max Age of Females  42.3  41.7  40.8  44.9  45.7 
Mean Max Age of Males  44.1  40.3  41.7  38.7  32.7 
Mean Max Education of Females  2.9  2.4  2.1  2.6  4.0 
Mean Max Education of Males  4.4  3.7  3.3  6.0  5.5 
Mean Household Size  5.3  5.2  5.2  5.9  5.1 
Observations
1 1711  912  786  57  145 
          
Male Recipient          
Percent Male Head  86.2%  95.3%  97.3%  93.5%  97.2% 
Percent No Spouse Present  16.7%  7.4%  3.8%  8.8%  8.9% 
Mean Pre-Transfer Income (1995 Taka)  22,425  22,937  21,966  24,517  21,026 
Mean Age of Head  44.6  49.7  46.4  46.6  57.5 
Mean Education of Head  2.4  3.1  3.3  3.0  3.4 
Mean Max Age of Females  41.1  45.5  43.9  42.6  51.7 
Mean Max Age of Males  41.0  49.4  46.9  46.2  57.2 
Mean Max Education of Females  2.5  3.6  3.4  3.4  4.6 
Mean Max Education of Males  3.7  5.6  5.4  5.3  6.9 
Mean Household Size  5.0  6.0  5.9  6.2  6.3 
Observations
1 2027  596  225  251  205 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions. 
1 Observations provide the unweighted number of households in each category. 
2 Non-recipient households include all households that did not contain a gift or loan recipient of the specified gender. 
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TABLE 5 - Distribution of Gift and Loan Recipient and Non-Recipient Households by Income Quintile 
and Gender, 1998/99 
   Household that received: 






of gift or 
loan Informal  Gift Informal  Loan Any Formal  Microcredit 
Male or Female Recipient           
1st Quintile  19.4  21.4  32.7  19.3  18.1  17.8 
2nd Quintile  21.1  18.6  24.1  14.0  18.4  18.8 
3rd Quintile  21.9  17.7  17.0  16.5  17.8  18.0 
4th Quintile  17.8  20.0  7.4  24.8  22.6  22.9 
5th Quintile  20.0  22.4  19.0  25.5  23.1  22.6 
            
Female Recipient           
1st Quintile  20.0  21.3  45.3  21.9  16.5  16.3 
2nd Quintile  20.3  18.7  21.7  17.0  19.1  18.9 
3rd Quintile  21.0  17.0  10.1  10.4  18.4  18.7 
4th Quintile  18.1  20.5  6.9  30.3  22.3  22.3 
5th Quintile  20.6  22.4  16.0  20.4  23.7  23.8 
            
Male Recipient           
1st Quintile  20.1  21.1  24.0  19.1  23.1  26.1 
2nd Quintile  20.5  17.9  25.8  12.9  15.1  17.5 
3rd Quintile  20.1  19.1  21.8  18.4  15.1  13.4 
4th Quintile  18.9  18.6  7.5  23.9  23.2  23.2 
5th Quintile  20.5  23.3  20.9  25.7  23.5  19.8 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  Household income quintile is 
determined  using total pre-transfer household income in the past year.  Distribution is determined by the percentage of  
households in each quintile receiving the specified gift or loan in the past year. 
1 Non-recipient households include all households which did not contain a gift or loan recipient of the specified gender. 
 
A few additional patterns become evident when household income and transfer 
recipiency is broken down by gender (Tables 4 and 5).  When females received informal gifts or 
loans, especially informal gifts, the household was more likely to be female-headed or lack a 
spouse.  Women headed over half of all households where females received informal gifts and 
nearly half of those recipient households lacked a spouse.  At the same time, nearly half (45 
percent) of all households with female recipients of informal gifts were in the lowest income 
quintile.  While households with male informal gift recipients were also slightly poorer than the 
average household, they do not appear to be as poor as the female recipient households.  The 
data also show that households with female informal gift recipients were not older than the 
average household, however households with male recipients contained significantly older 
individuals than the average household.   
Individual Characteristics:  The characteristics of individual recipients of credit and 
transfers reiterate much of the information from the household characteristics—largely that 
recipients of informal gifts differ the most from other types of recipients.  They are, on average, 
older, less likely to be married (though most are married), and more likely to be widowed.  But 
the characteristics of individual recipients also add a more detailed picture about who was 
receiving gifts and loans in rural Bangladesh (Table 6).  With the exception of formal credit 
(including microcredit), household heads received the majority of gifts and loans.    
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TABLE 6 - Individual Characteristics of Gift and Loan Recipients by Gender, 1998/99  
      Type of Loan Received 
     Formal   
  
All Gifts and 
Loans  Informal Gifts All  Any Formal Microcredit  Informal 
All Recipients           
Mean Age  39.5  48.6  37.1  35.9  35.0  40.9 
Mean Education  2.2  3.0  2.0  1.7  1.4  3.0 
Household Relationship             
Head 43.0%  64.9%  37.7%  24.1%  17.5%  75.8% 
Spouse 47.9%  24.2%  53.8%  69.0%  75.6%  11.9% 
Child 4.3%  4.4%  4.2%  2.7%  2.2%  7.9% 
Parent 1.9%  4.4%  1.2%  1.1%  1.2%  1.5% 
Other 3.0%  2.1%  3.1%  3.1%  3.5%  2.9% 
Percent Married  86.3%  72.4%  89.1%  89.9%  89.4%  87.5% 
Percent Widowed  9.7%  21.2%  7.4%  7.9%  8.3%  6.2% 
            
Female Recipients           
Mean Age  36.0  41.9  34.9  34.7  34.6  39.0 
Mean Education  1.5  2.4  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.7 
Household Relationship             
Head 10.7%  31.4%  7.0%  6.4%  6.4%  15.8% 
Spouse 80.0%  49.8%  85.6%  87.1%  87.3%  65.2% 
Child 2.2%  6.2%  1.5%  1.3%  1.0%  4.6% 
Parent 3.1%  9.0%  2.0%  1.4%  1.4%  8.8% 
Other 4.1%  3.7%  3.9%  3.8%  3.9%  5.5% 
Percent Married  81.2%  50.3%  86.5%  88.5%  88.7%  63.7% 
Percent Widowed  15.7%  42.0%  11.7%  9.9%  9.6%  33.5% 
            
Male Recipients           
Mean Age  44.5  54.8  40.6  40.7  37.3  41.3 
Mean Education  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.4  2.7  3.3 
Household Relationship             
Head 90.5%  96.2%  88.9%  91.0%  87.6%  88.4% 
Spouse 0.6%  0.2%  0.9%  1.0%  1.6%  0.7% 
Child 7.4%  2.7%  8.7%  7.7%  10.1%  8.6% 
Parent 0.1%  0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Other 1.4%  0.6%  1.6%  0.4%  0.6%  2.3% 
Percent Married  93.7%  93.0%  93.4%  95.1%  93.9%  92.5% 
Percent Widowed  0.8%  1.7%  0.3%  0.4%  0.0%  0.5% 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes:  Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions. 
 
The household head received roughly 76 percent of informal loans and 65 percent of informal 
gifts.  Formal credit is the exception because a large portion of formal credit (more specifically 
microcredit) is targeted towards women.  As a result, the spouse of the household head received 
the majority of formal credit. 
Table 6 shows several differences between the recipients of various types of gifts and 
loans as well as differences between male and female recipients.  Male recipients of informal 
transfers are significantly older than other types of male recipients as well as female informal 
transfer recipients.  Additionally, the data also show that male recipients of all types are more 
likely to be married than female recipients and less likely to be widowed.  Finally, the table 
illustrates that male recipients tend to be more educated than female recipients, which is not  
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surprising in rural Bangladesh.  Furthermore, recipients of informal credit and transfers of both 
genders appear to be slightly more educated than recipients of formal credit.  
C.  The Nature of Credit and Transfers in the Formal and Informal Sectors 
Sources of Informal Credit and Transfers:  Relatives (as opposed to non-relatives) were 
the primary sources and recipients of informal credit and transfers in rural Bangladesh during 
1998/99.  Relatives accounted for 61 percent of the total value of informal loans received and 
were the only senders of informal gifts (Table 3).  While slightly more households received loans 
from non-relative than relatives, the average size of loans from relatives was roughly three times 
the size of the average loan from non-relatives.  The fact that informal transfers occurred only 
between relatives as opposed to non-relatives is similar to findings in previous studies. 
The largest source of informal transfer money was remittances from relatives living 
abroad (Figure 2).  Though more households received informal gifts from within Bangladesh, the 
average size of gifts received from abroad were roughly four times the size of gifts from urban 
areas and ten times the size of gifts from rural areas.  Overall, remittances accounted for 71 
percent of the total value of informal gifts received. 
Households were more likely to receive gifts from close relatives (parents, spouses, and 
children) and more likely to receive loans from more distant relatives (i.e., in-laws and relatives 
such as aunt/uncles).
10  Overall, households received only three percent of their informal relative 
loan value from parents and children while they received 87 percent of their informal gift value 
from parents, spouses, and children.  Children alone accounted for roughly half of the value of 
all informal gifts received.  Households received about the same amount of gifts as loans from 
siblings.  Interestingly, money received from the recipient’s parents was more likely to be a gift 
while money received from the parents of the recipient’s spouse was more likely to be a loan. 
Households received non-relative credit from a wide variety of sources, however 
neighbors were the single largest source of informal non-relative credit.  Friends and neighbors 
combined for roughly forty percent of all informal non-relative credit.  Meanwhile, roughly two 
percent of households received credit from moneylenders, accounting for 23 percent of all non-
relative informal credit and 9 percent of the informal credit received.  Overall, households turned 
to relatives and close acquaintances (i.e., friends and neighbors) for over 75 percent of the total 
value of informal loans they received. 
Recipients of informal transfers and credit from relatives were more likely to receive gifts 
than loans.  Nearly three times as many households received gifts from relatives (14.6 percent) 
than loans (5.6 percent, Table 3).  Interestingly, while households in this survey received 
substantially more money in gifts and loans from relatives, they actually sent slightly more 
money in loans than gifts to relatives (not shown).  Though the differences in the number and 
size of gifts and loans sent to relatives are slight, they do provide further evidence of the fluid 
                                                 
10 This pattern may still signal a fluid interpretation of transfers and loans.  Households may assume that everything 
received from closer relatives are a gift and everything received from a distant relative is a loan.   
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interpretation of gifts and loans with households more likely to consider money received 
informally as a gift and money sent informally as a loan. 
Types of Informal Credit and Transfers:  Informal sector gifts and loans are 
predominantly sent in the form of cash (as opposed to in-kind) in rural Bangladesh.  Cash gifts 
and loans accounted for over 95 percent of both informal sector transfers sent and received in the 
past year (Figure 3).  Food and other gifts comprised only about five percent of gifts received.
11  
Few households appear to receive food and other gifts, and the size of those gifts is drastically 
smaller than the cash gifts and loans.  
 
Sources of Formal Credit:  Microcredit was the primary source of formal credit in rural 
Bangladesh during 1998 and 1999.  According to the survey data, microcredit comprised 83 
percent of formal lending in the past year (Table 3).  The Grameen Bank accounted for nearly 
half (48 percent) of all formal loans and over half (58 percent) of all microcredit loans.  More 
than a quarter of all households received at least one microcredit loan in the past year, and 
eighteen percent of households received a loan from at least one of the three main microcredit 
institutions – BRAC, BRDB, and the Grameen Bank.  The Grameen Bank alone provided credit 
to twelve percent of all households.  Only four percent of households received a loan from either 
the government or another non-government institution, however the average loan size was 
slightly larger from those institutions (9,502 Tk.) than from microcredit banks (6,700 Tk.).   
Perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising to see that microcredit is the primary source of formal 
credit in rural Bangladesh.  As noted, Bangladesh has the largest operation of microcredit 
programs in the world, with about 12.4 million active borrowers and over 629 NGOs engaged in 
microcredit (World Bank 2003, 21). 
                                                 
11 It is possible that food and other gifts may be slightly underrepresented in the survey since cash gifts and loans 
may be easier to account for than food or other gifts, especially since the size of these gifts may be quite small.  
Additionally, there is likely greater measurement error with food and other gifts as respondents may be more likely 























Figure 3. Types of Informal Gifts and Loans, 1998/99
Percentage of Total Household Informal Gifts and Loans Sent and Received
Source: Authors' weighted tabulation from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh 
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TABLE 7 - Size of Gifts and Loans Received Relative to Total Household Income, 1998/99 
      Type of Loan Received 
     Formal  
   All Gifts and Loans  Informal Gift  All  Any Formal Microcredit  Informal 
1st Quintile  265.3%  77.0%  329.6%  364.5%  397.2%  177.9% 
2nd Quintile  62.4%  47.7%  58.2%  59.7%  60.1%  38.8% 
3rd Quintile  41.1%  32.4%  39.5%  34.7%  33.1%  42.4% 
4th Quintile  28.5%  27.4%  26.7%  26.6%  25.2%  21.7% 
5th Quintile  27.8%  22.1%  26.4%  20.7%  17.2%  30.8% 
All 86.2%  48.3%  88.3%  92.5%  95.8%  57.6% 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes:  Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  The relative size of gifts 
gifts and loans is based on total post-transfer household income in the past year.  Gifts are counted as income while loans are not.
 
Size of Transfers and Credit Relative to Household Income:  Credit and transfers received 
by households were large in comparison with total household income (Table 7).
12  Informal 
transfers received were nearly half of total household income and accounted for a far greater 
percentage for households in the lowest income quintiles (77 percent for households in the 
bottom quintile).  The data appear to show that informal transfers may be more important to rural 
Bangladesh recipients than recipients of other countries.  For example, Cox and Jimenez (1995) 
found that private transfers accounted for roughly 15 percent of total household income for rural 
recipient households in the Philippines and Cox (2002) found that they amounted to 
approximately 25 percent of household income for recipients in Vietnam.   
The size of the informal transfers relative to income may be slightly higher in 1998 than 
other years due to the flooding that occurred in Bangladesh in 1998.  Nonetheless many 
households rely heavily on informal transfers, especially remittances from abroad.  One study 
estimated that 3 million workers of Bangladeshi origin were working abroad, and those workers 
sent remittances to roughly four percent of all Bangladeshi households (World Bank 2002).  Of 
those households receiving remittances, roughly half used them as their primary source of 
income.  Our data show roughly five percent of rural households received remittances that 
averaged 40,000 Taka in size.  Thus, it appears that for those relatively few households (14.6 
percent) who received informal transfers, the value of the transfers made up a substantial portion 
of household income. 
Not surprisingly, credit of all forms was larger relative to total household income than 
informal transfers.  Not only is the value of credit received not included in total household 
income, but loans may often be used for more than a single year.  While informal transfers are 
generally used for consumption in a given year, credit may be used over the course of several 
years to generate additional income.  Nevertheless, the important point from this analysis is that 
the loans received by rural households in Bangladesh were not inconsequential.  For example, 
the average loan received from a microcredit organization was nearly equivalent in value to the 
entire yearly household income for the average recipient household.  For those households in the 
                                                 
12 The value of transfers received is included as part of household income while the value of credit received is not, 
thus allowing for credit to make up more than 100 percent of household income.  
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lowest income quintile, average microcredit loans received were valued at nearly four times the 
annual household income.   
Overall, the value of gifts and loans received by households in rural Bangladesh were 
equivalent to approximately 86 percent of total income, on average, for recipient households.  
Thus we have seen that nearly half of all households received credit and/or transfers in rural 
Bangladesh, and the value of those transactions was quite large relative to household income.    
D.  The Role of Formal and Informal Sectors by Gender 
In rural Bangladesh, men receive more money through transfers and credit than women.  
The average household received about 3,700 Taka in formal and informal gifts and loans to men 
while women, on average, only received roughly 2,900 Taka (not shown).  This difference is due 
to the larger loan sizes received by men, especially informal loans (Table 8).  There are actually 
fewer households where females did not receive any gift or loan (70 percent) than households 
where males did not receive a gift or loan (76 percent, not shown). 
Relative Importance of Formal and Informal Sectors by Gender:  Surprisingly, males rely 
almost entirely on informal credit and transfers while females are relatively split between their 
reliance on the formal and informal financial sectors.  Males received only 16 percent of their 
credit and transfers from formal sources (Table 8).
13  Females, on the other hand, received over 
half (52 percent) of their credit and transfers from the formal sector.   
Within the informal sector, women rely almost exclusively on gifts (as opposed to loans).   
Nearly three times as many households had women receive informal gifts as received informal 
loans, and the average gift size was roughly three times the average loan size (Table 8).  Overall, 
informal loans accounted for only five percent of total transfers and credit for women while 
informal gifts accounted for 43 percent of the total.   
Unlike women who rely mostly on gifts in the informal sector, men depend on both 
informal gifts and loans.  In rural Bangladesh, more households had males who received 
informal loans (11 percent) than gifts (9 percent).  However, because the average gift size was 
roughly 1.7 times greater than the average loan size, the total value of informal gifts received by 
males was still slightly larger than the total value of informal loans received.  In comparison with 
women, though, informal loans are much more important to men as they account for nearly half 
of the male informal sector (42 percent) and only ten percent of the female informal sector. 
 
                                                 
13 Again, these numbers underestimate the formal sector as formal transfers are not included in the survey.  
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TABLE 8 - Sources of Gifts and Loans Received by Gender, 1998/99                      
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Informal Transfers  5.7  21,603  100.0  42.5  145    9.1  19,975  100.0  48.9  205 
Relative Transfers  5.7  21,603  100.0  42.5  145    9.1  19,975  100.0  48.9  205 
Spouse 2.6  31,905  66.3  28.1  63    0.1  30,207  1.7  0.8  4 
Child 2.0  11,951  19.6  8.3  49    5.6  21,236  65.5  32.0  128 
Parent 0.4  24,941  8.9  3.8  13    0.7  21,699  8.6  4.2  16 
Sibling 0.3  4,786  1.3  0.5  11    1.3  18,526  13.7  6.7  30 
In-law 0.1  2,735  0.1  0.1  2    0.8  12,051  5.5  2.7  17 
Other 0.1  3,590  0.4  0.2  3    0.3  21,802  3.8  1.9  10 
                      
Informal Loans  2.2  6,907  100.0  5.2  57    10.9  11,812  100.0  34.7  251 
Relative Loans  1.3  6,523  55.4  2.9  32    4.6  17,297  61.3  21.2  102 
Parent 0.0  5,635  0.9  0.0  1    0.1  2,101  0.1  0.0  4 
Child 0.0  8,270  1.4  0.1  1    0.1  18,819  1.6  0.6  4 
Sibling 0.3  4,346  7.3  0.4  8    1.0  23,528  19.1  6.6  19 
Mother/Father-in-law 0.2 20,919  20.9  1.1  4    0.8 28,847  18.1  6.3  10 
Other Relative  0.9  4,276  24.9  1.3  20    3.4  8,509  22.4  7.8  74 
Non-Relative Loans  1.1  6,232  43.7  2.3  29    7.7  6,501  38.7  13.4  178 
Friends 0.1  4,034  1.4  0.1  2    1.4  4,571  4.9  1.7  35 
Neighbors 0.4  3,924  11.6  0.6  11    3.0  4,587  10.6  3.7  71 
Moneylenders 0.3  12,547  25.8  1.4  8    2.1  4,314  6.9  2.4 51 
Other Non-Relatives  0.3  2,949  4.9  0.3  8    2.2  9,025  15.6  5.4  50 
                      
Formal Loans  23.6  6,428  100.0  52.3  786    7.2  8,473  100.0  16.4  225 
All Microcredit  23.2  6,405  98.0  51.2  776    3.9  7,102  45.7  7.5  144 
Program Loans  15.7  7,277  75.4  39.4  575    2.8  8,152  37.8  6.2  114 
BRAC 4.8  4,764  14.9  7.8  151    0.3  7,826  3.3  0.5  7 
BRDB 1.0  5,066  3.4  1.8  34    0.8  6,530  9.0  1.5  25 
GB 10.3  8,438  57.1  29.8  405    1.7  8,990  25.5  4.2  82 
Other Microcredit  8.3  4,159  22.6  11.8  223    1.1  4,388  7.9  1.3  30 
Other Formal Loans  0.5  6,013  2.2  1.1  14    3.3  10,084  54.0  8.9  82 
Government 0.1  3,855  0.4  0.2  4    1.7  8,259  23.0  3.8  45 
Non-Government 0.4  6,247  1.8  0.9  11      1.8 10,618  31.0  5.1  42 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes:  Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  Columns may not add up due to rounding.  See text for category definitions. 
1 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (1995 Tk.) that a household received, for households with non-zero values.  Average 1995 Tk./US $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
2 Percentages are calculated based on the total value received (accounting for the percentage of households receiving and average amount received). 
3 n provides the unweighted number of households who received the specified gift or loan.  
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Informal Credit and Transfers by Gender:  Informal gifts and loans flow primarily between 
men in rural Bangladesh.  Over half of all informal gifts (57 percent) and loans (83 percent) received 
were from men to other men (Figure 4).  The next largest portion of these transactions was from men 
to women, comprising roughly 40 percent of all informal gifts and 8 percent of loans (Figure 4).  
Women sent only about three percent of all informal gifts and nine percent of all informal loans 
received.  Even the majority of gifts and loans sent from women went to men.  Overall, nearly three 
times as many households had males (19 percent) who were active in the informal sector compared 
with females (7 percent, not shown).  This resulted in males receiving nearly 60 percent of all informal 



























































Figure 4. Share of Total Informal Gifts and Loans Received by Sex of Sender and Receiver
Uncorrected vs. Relative Correction*
Source: Authors' weighted tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
*The correction adjusts the gender of recipients who received loans and gifts from in-laws to the opposite sex.  
Please refer to the text for further details. 
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TABLE 9 – Informal Gifts and Loans Received by Gender, 1998/99  
   Received















Relative Gifts             
From Female to Female  0.3%  5,463  2488  14  0.4%  5,123  2044  15 
From Female to Male  0.9%  6,970  1693  20  0.9%  7,288  1834  19 
From Male to Female  5.5%  22,223  2819  136  5.9%  22,142  2862  145 
From Male to Male  8.4%  20,679  2660  192  8.0%  20,782  2678  182 
                
Relative Loans             
From Female to Female  0.3%  3,852  1442  9  0.3%  3,061  764  10 
From Female to Male  1.1%  6,109  2283  26  1.1%  6,189  2253  26 
From Male to Female  1.0%  7,036  2593  23  1.6%  17,434  7740  28 
From Male to Male  3.7%  19,558  6398  80  3.3%  15,473  4707  76 
                
Non-Relative Loans             
From Female to Female  0.5%  3,598  999  14  0.5%  3,598  999  14 
From Female to Male  0.9%  3,685  901  23  0.9%  3,685  901  23 
From Male to Female  0.4%  11,465  6843  8  0.4%  11,465  6843  8 
From Male to Male  6.4%  6,957  1331  153    6.4%  6,957  1331  153 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes:  Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions. 
1 The sex of the gift or loan source is missing in certain cases.  Therefore the sum of the gifts and loans by gender will not add up to total 
informal gifts and loans. 
2 The correction adjusts the gender of recipients who received loans and gifts from in-laws to the opposite sex.  Please refer to the text 
for further details. 
3 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (in 1995 Taka) that a household received, for households with non-zero values.  
Average 1995 Tk./U.S. $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
4 n provides the unweighted number of households who received the specified loan or gift. 
 
Though men still send and receive the majority of informal transfers, the gender differences are 
much larger for informal credit than for informal transfers, especially with respect to credit from non-
relatives.  Approximately eight times as many households had men receive loans from non-relatives as 
had women receive loans from non-relatives (Table 9).  Furthermore, the informal loans received by 
men were significantly larger, on average, than the informal loans received by women. The finding that 
informal transfers and credit flow primarily between men in Bangladesh is surprising because the 
limited evidence on the flow of informal transfers and credit from the literature suggests that they are 
more likely to flow to women (Cox and Jimenez 1992).   Even limiting our analysis to informal 
transfers (as Cox and Jimenez did), the majority of informal transfers (gifts) received were from men 
to other men.   
Within the informal sector, men and women looked to different sources for informal transfers 
(Table 8).
14  The single largest source of informal transfers for women was their spouses, accounting 
for roughly two-thirds of all informal transfers.  Men, on the other hand, received nearly two-thirds of 
their informal transfers from children and only two percent of their informal transfers from spouses.  
Children were the second largest source of informal transfers for women, sending approximately 28 
                                                 
14 While there were significant gender differences in the sources of informal gifts, the differences are not as evident with 
respect to informal loans.  However, this may be due to the exceptionally small number of females receiving informal 
loans.  With only 57 total observations, it is difficult to make strong generalizations.  The larger point with respect to 
informal loans is that women rarely receive them, no matter which source sends the loan.  
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percent of the total value of informal gifts received by women.  Additionally, siblings and in-laws were 
much more important sources of informal transfers for men than for women. 
Combining the information on the senders of informal transfer with the individual 
characteristics of recipients, we can piece together a much clearer picture of who was receiving 
informal transfers in Bangladesh.  It appears that a significant number of older men, almost all of 
whom were still married, received informal gifts mostly from children.  Women informal transfer 
recipients were more likely to be split into two types: (1) older widows who received gifts from 
children and (2) younger wives who received informal transfers from spouses who were temporarily 
away from the household.  The data show that children were much more likely to send transfers to 
their fathers if they were still alive than to their mothers, which is not surprising in the male-dominated 
society.  Obviously not all recipients fit these categories, and many households received gifts from 
sources other than children and spouses; however these categories fit a large portion of the recipients 
of informal transfers. 
Throughout our analysis, we use the gender of the sender and recipient as reported by 
households in the survey.  However, households may not always report the true recipient of the gift or 
loan.  Whether due to cultural, religious, or other issues, it may be that households report a male as the 
recipient, even if the transaction was directed to a female in the household.  To investigate whether the 
gender results are sensitive to this reporting, we reclassify the gender of some recipients (senders) by 
their relationship to the sender (recipient).  In general, recipients (senders) who received (sent) a gift or 
loan from (to) an in-law are recoded as the opposite sex for this sensitivity analysis.  For example, a 
male who receives a transfer from a mother/father in-law would be reclassified as a female recipient.  
Similarly, a female who sends a loan to a brother/sister in-law would be reclassified as a male sender.  
In the end, this recoding did not have an enormous effect on the results.  In total, out of roughly 1,200 
observations of individuals sending and receiving informal gifts and loans, only 36 observations were 
reclassified from male to female and only 21 observations were reclassified from female to male.   
Figure 4 displays the results from this correction.  While males remain the primary recipients 
and sources of gifts and loans after the reclassification, there was a definite shift from male-to-male 
flows to male-to-female flows for both gifts and loans.  The shift is much larger with respect to loans, 
however looking more closely at the data reveals that the shift was caused mostly by the movement of 
a few relatively large loans from men to women.  Nevertheless, in-laws are clearly a more important 
source for informal gifts and loans for males than females, leading to the conclusion that women are 
somewhat more important to the informal sector than they would appear at first glance.  Without the 
female spouse, these transactions never would have occurred. 
Formal Credit by Gender:  In rural Bangladesh, microcredit is effectively the only source of 
formal credit for women and is also an important source of formal credit for men.  Microcredit 
accounted for an astounding 98 percent of formal loans to women (Table 8).   Nearly six times as many 
households had women who received credit from a microcredit organization (23 percent) as 
households with male microcredit recipients (4 percent).  Though microcredit is a less vital source of 
formal credit for males, it still accounted for nearly half of all formal loans to men in the past year.   
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Average loan sizes from microcredit organizations appeared to be slightly larger for men than for 
women.  
Government and non-government loans (e.g., Krishi Bank, BSCIC) to women were virtually 
non-existent.  Average loan amounts to women from government and non-government sources were 
similar in size to loan amounts from microcredit programs, but so few women received government 
and non-government loans (0.1 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively) that loans from those institutions 
made up only two percent of all formal credit received by females in the past year (Table 8).   
Men, on the other hand, rely on government and non-government loans as an important source 
of formal credit.  Non-government loans accounted for nearly one-third (31 percent) of all formal loans 
to men while government loans comprised over one-fifth (23 percent) of all formal loans received by 
men (Table 8).  Not only do more men than women receive loans from government and non-
government sources, but the average size of those loans is nearly double for men.  On the whole, 
however, relatively few households have males receiving credit from government (1.7 percent), non-
government (1.7 percent), or microcredit (3.9 percent) institutions, and the informal financial sector 
remains a much more important source for credit and transfers than the formal sector for men.  
E. The Relationship Between the Formal and Informal Sectors  
It is surprising that roughly half of all households received no gifts or loans in the past year 
(Figure 5).  This suggests that there is room for financial sector growth in Bangladesh, especially given 
that many of the poorest households are not receiving credit or transfers from either sector.  Seventy-
six percent of households had no male who received any gift or loan.  Women fared only slightly better 
than men.  Seventy percent of households had no female who received a gifts or loan in the past year.  
Excluding microcredit loans, over 90 percent of households did not have any female receiving money 
from either formal or informal sources.  
Households in rural Bangladesh rarely receive gifts and loans from both the formal and 
informal sectors.  While 49 percent of households received some type of formal or informal credit or 
transfer in the past year, only six percent of households received a gift or loan from both sectors 
(Figure 5).  Twenty-four percent received credit only from a formal institution, and 19 percent received 
a gift or loan only from an informal source.  Thus, of all households that received a gift or loan in the 
past year, only 12 percent received it from both the formal and informal sectors.
15   
 
                                                 
15 This percentage does not match the six percent number in Figure 4 because it includes only the 49 percent of households 
that received a gift or loan in the past year.   
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The use of both formal and informal credit and transfers is even rarer when looking at 
household behavior by gender.  Only two percent of households had males and females receiving a gift 
or loan from both sectors (Figure 5).  Instead, males rely almost entirely on the informal sector for 
credit and transfers while females rely on the formal sector and specifically microcredit institutions.   
While the evidence clearly shows that individual households do not rely on both the formal and 
informal sectors for credit and transfers, the reason for this behavior is not as clear.  It is possible that 
the formal sector is reaching a population of individuals who otherwise would not be able to access 
money from the informal sector.  After all, our analysis of recipient households revealed that recipients 
of informal credit and transfer were wealthier, on average, than households that received formal loans.  
However, another possibility is that microcredit organizations and other formal sources may be 
crowding out the informal sector, replacing informal gifts and loans with formal loans.   
To further investigate this issue, we take advantage of the panel nature of the survey and 
examine households that were included in both waves of the study.  We descriptively examine the 
relationship between the formal and informal sectors.  We examine whether formal sector finance is 
positively or negatively associated with informal sector finance, and whether this association varies for 


















Source: Authors' weighted tabulation from the 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
Figure 5. Household Gifts and Loans Received
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TABLE 10 – Changes in the Use of the Formal and Informal Financial Sectors Between 1991/92 and 1998/99 
   Male    Female 
   All  Household
4 Male




1  537 115 115    464  464 
Increased Informal Sector  85  24  22    67  30 
Decreased Informal Sector  77  18  14    66  27 
No Change in Informal Sector  375  73  79    331  407 
           
Formal Decreased
2  272 167 167    149  149 
Increased Informal Sector  58  38  36    26  9 
Decreased Informal Sector  33  19  17    16  10 
No Change in Informal Sector  181  110  114    107  130 
           
Formal No Change
3  843 1370  1370    1039  1039 
Increased Informal Sector  182  263  183    232  68 
Decreased Informal Sector  156  229  172    184  77 
No Change in Informal Sector  505  878  1015    623  894 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
 
General Notes: The table includes 1,652 households for which longitudinal data were available to examine changes in the use of the formal and 
informal sectors between 1991/92 and 1998/99.  The informal sector includes both informal gifts and loans.  All numbers are unweighted household 
counts. 
1 Formal increased includes all households that received more formal loans in 1998/99 than in 1991/92. 
2 Formal decreased includes all households that received less formal loans in 1998/99 than in 1991/92. 
3 Formal no change includes all households that received the same amount of formal loans in both waves. 
4 The household subcolumns display the household behavior in the informal sector given the particular change in the formal sector.  For example, of 
the 115 households where male household members increased the cumulative value of formal loans they received between 1991/92 and 
1998/99, 24 households increased, 18 households decreased, and 73 households had no change in the cumulative value of informal gifts and 
loans received by (males and females in) the household between 1991/92 and 1998/99. 
5 The male and female subcolumns display the informal sector behavior of household members of the specified gender given the particular change 
in the formal sector.  For example, of the 115 households where male household members increased the cumulative value of formal loans they 
received between 1991/92 and 1998/99, 22 households increased, 14 decreased, and 79 had no change in the cumulative value of informal gifts 
and loans received by males in the household between 1991/92 and 1998/99. 
 
Of the 537 unweighted households that received more formal credit in 1998/99 than in 
1991/92, 85 households (16 percent) also received more informal gifts and loans while 77 households 
(14 percent) received less informal gifts and loans.  375 households (70 percent) saw no change in 
money received from the informal sector—that is they received no finance from the informal sector in 
either wave (Table 10).
16   
The majority of households that received less formal credit in 1998/99 than in 1991/92 also 
received the same amount of money from the informal sector in both waves (67 percent, Table 11).  
Only 58 households (21 percent) received more money from the informal sector while 33 households 
(12 percent) received less money from the informal sector (Table 10).  This pattern continues for 
households that had no change (zero in both waves) in the amount of formal credit in 1991/92 and 
1998/99.  These unweighted numbers suggest that formal credit may not substitute for informal credit 
and transfers in rural Bangladesh.  No matter whether households received more, less, or the same 
amount of formal credit, the vast majority saw no change in money received from the informal sector, 
and a slightly larger percentage of households received more money from the informal sector than  
                                                 
16 All households that saw no change in the amount of informal gifts and loans between 1991/92 and 1998/99 received no 
money in either wave of the survey from the informal sector.  This is also the case for households that had no change in the 
amount of formal credit received.  
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TABLE 11 –  Correlation Coefficients Between the Change in the Use of the Formal and Informal 
Financial Sectors Between 1991/92 and 1998/99 
  Change in Formal Loans 
   All Male  Female 
Change in Informal Gifts and Loans  0.019  0.016  0.031 
  (0.44) (0.52)  (0.21) 
      
Change in Informal Loans  -0.017  -0.001  0.008 
  (0.50) (0.97)  (0.76) 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
 
General Notes: The table includes 1,652 households for which longitudinal data were available to examine changes in the 
use of the formal and informal sectors between 1991/92 and 1998/99.  P-values are in parentheses below the correlation 
coefficients.  Correlation coefficients are weighted to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  
Columns display changes in household behavior of the specified gender.  For example, the male column displays the 
correlation coefficient between the change in the cumulative value of male informal gifts and loans between (or male 
informal loans only) and the change in the cumulative value of male formal loans. 
 
received less money.  We find similar results when credit and transfers are broken down by gender 
(Table 10) and when the relationship between formal credit and informal credit (i.e., excluding 
informal gifts from the analysis) is examined (not shown).  The descriptive evidence appears to show 
that formal credit is mostly reaching households who otherwise would not have access to the informal 
sector or who choose not to move from the corner of no informal sector use. 
The correlation coefficients between the change in money received from formal loans and from 
informal gifts and loans further support that the formal and informal sectors are not acting as 
substitutes.  If the formal and informal sectors were linear substitutes, we would expect statistically 
significant negative correlation coefficients.  However, Table 11 shows that none of the correlation 
coefficients are close to statistical significance, and few are even negative.  Overall, none of the 
bivariate evidence suggests that households are substituting formal credit for the informal sector in 
rural Bangladesh.  Instead, households with limited access to informal gifts and loans appear to receive 
the majority of formal credit. 
F. Changes in the Financial Sectors Between 1991/92 and 1998/99 
During the seven years between the 1991/92 and the 1998/99 surveys, there was significant 
growth in both the formal and informal financial sectors in rural Bangladesh.  Additional households 
gained access to money through credit and transfers, and the size of those transactions increased 
considerably.  Beyond the growth in the receipt of transfers and credit, substantial shifts occurred in 
the sources of those formal and informal gifts and loans with large differences between males and 
females.   
These changes occurred in the context of substantial economic growth, a large increase in 
microcredit programs, and a massive flood between the time periods.  The gross domestic product of 
Bangladesh increased 52 percent between 1990 and 1999 (World Bank 2001), while rural poverty 
dropped roughly eight percentage points (World Bank 2002).  The microcredit sector moved from 
being dominated by three major programs to over 629 NGOs engaged in microcredit.  The massive 
1998 flood led the government to increase formal transfers by 80 percent (World Bank 2002, 67) and  
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exposed the vulnerability of microcredit programs to natural disasters.  Many microcredit programs 
could not maintain their high loan recovery rates as borrowers suffered asset and income losses.  With 
government help, many programs allowed borrowers to suspend loan repayments during the flood and 
allowed borrowers to take out new loans (World Bank 2003, 21).  
Between 1991/92 and 1998/99, the average amount of formal loans and informal gifts and 
loans received increased substantially (Figure 6).
17  Overall, the formal and informal sectors each 
increased by roughly two and a half times, leaving the informal sector larger than the formal sector 
throughout the 1990’s in rural Bangladesh (68 percent versus 32 percent in both waves, not shown).
18  
However, the expansions in the two sectors were markedly different as the growth in the informal 
sector can be attributed almost entirely to increases in loan sizes while the formal sector growth was 
predominantly spurred by an expansion in the number of households receiving loans.  In the formal 
sector, nearly twice as many households received formal loans in 1998/99 as in 1991/92 (Table 12).  In 
the formal sector, formal transfers, primarily in the form of food for work, education, or training, grew 
80 percent from FY 1992 to FY 1999.  This increase was in response to heavy floods in 1998 (World 
Bank 2002, 67).  Meanwhile, the informal sector, the percentage of households receiving informal gifts 
and loans remained steady, however the average size of those transactions more than doubled in the 
seven-year time span. 
 
 
                                                 
17 In this analysis, we include data from all households in both waves keeping households that were in the first wave and 
not the second wave and vice versa.  The average gift and loan values vary slightly when using only households that were 
included in both waves, however the results are qualitatively identical. 
18As noted in Section A, a rough approximation of the formal sector estimates that including formal transfers in the formal 
sector measure revises the relative sizes of the informal and formal sector to 61 percent versus 39 percent.  



























Average Total Value of Household Formal and Informal Credit and Transfers Sent and Received
1
Source: Authors' weighted tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
1 Average values are for both recipient and non-recipient households. 
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TABLE 12 - Sources of Gifts and Loans Received by Survey Wave                      
  Wave 1: 1991/92    Wave 2: 1998/99 































% of Total Gifts 









Informal Gifts  14.4  8,461  1519  100.0  47.8    14.6  20,879  1878 100.0  46.1 
Relative Transfers  14.4  8,461  1519  100.0  47.8    14.6  20,879  1878  100.0  46.1 
                      
Informal Loans  11.8  4,356  394  100.0  20.3    12.7  11,339  2335  100.0  21.8 
Relative Loans  5.8  4,062  531  45.4  9.2    5.6  15,560  4455  60.5  13.2 
Non-Relative Loans  7.1  3,961  336  54.6  11.1    8.6  6,563  1065  39.2  8.5 
                      
Formal Loans  15.7  5,178  404  100.0  32.0    29.3  7,254  298  100.0  32.1 
All Microcredit  13.1  4,989  145  80.2  25.6    26.4  6,700  199  83.1  26.7 
Program Loans  12.6  5,069  142  78.5  25.1    18.3  7,521  250  64.7  20.8 
BRAC 3.9  4,209  219  20.2  6.4    5.0  4,920  293  11.6  3.7 
BRDB 3.8  5,014  275  23.4  7.5    1.7  6,209  714  5.0  1.6 
GB 4.9  5,794  222  34.9  11.2    12.0  8,508  323  48.1  15.5 
Other Microcredit  0.5  2,738  661  1.7  0.6    9.1  4,300  251  18.4  5.9 
Other Formal Loans  2.7  5,986  2255  19.8  6.3    3.8  9,502  1728  17.0  5.5 
Government 1.2  4,452  460  6.8  2.2    1.8  7,904  740  6.9  2.2 
Non-Government 1.4  7,295  4115  13.0  4.2      2.2  9,764  2593  10.2  3.3 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh.   
General Notes: Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  Columns may not add up due to rounding.  Please see text for category definitions.  The 
sample contains 1769 households in the 1st wave and 2623 households in the 2nd wave. 
1 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (1995 Tk.) that a household received, for households with non-zero values.  Average 1995 Tk./US $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
2 Percentages are calculated based on the total value received (accounting for the percentage of households receiving and average amount received).  
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While the total value of informal gifts and loans received grew immensely, the average 
amount of informal gifts and loans sent decreased by more than half between 1991/92 and 
1998/99 (Figure 6).  Almost all of this decrease was due to the decreased percentage of 
households sending in the informal sector, however the average size of gifts and loans sent also 
decreased.  Overall, a substantial portion of the decrease in sending, as well as some of the 
increase in receiving, can be explained by the flooding that occurred during the second wave of 
the survey.  It is not surprising that households would receive more aid in a time of need and 
send less. 
Loans from virtually all sources of formal credit increased between 1991/92 and 1998/99 
(Table 12).  The majority of the formal credit increase came from microcredit organizations.  
Twice as many households received a loan from a microcredit organization in 1998/99 as 
received one in 1991/92 (26 percent versus 13 percent, Table 12).  A significant portion of this 
increase came from microcredit institutions outside of the three major programs, documenting 
the substantial rise of microcredit organizations in rural Bangladesh.  Other microcredit 
organizations reached less than one percent of households in 1991/92, however by 1998/99, they 
reached nine percent of households.  There was also a substantial increase in the size of two of 
the three main microcredit programs during the 1990’s.  In fact, the Grameen Bank doubled the 
number of households it lent money to (12 percent versus 5 percent) and increased the average 
loan size by nearly 60 percent (8,508 Tk. versus 5,794 Tk). 
The rise in microcredit lending was nearly matched by increases in the number and size 
of government and non-government loans.  While more households received loans from these 
organizations in 1998/99, they still only reached four percent of households. However, the 
average loan size from these institutions did increase nearly 60 percent in the 1990’s (Table 12).  
Overall, government and non-government loans grew at a slightly slower pace than microcredit 
loans, leading to a small increase in microcredit’s share of formal lending in rural Bangladesh 
and maintaining its position as the dominant source of formal credit (Table 12).   
Between 1991/92 and 1998/99, there was a shift in the financial sectors that men and 
women relied upon for transfers and credit in rural Bangladesh.  Men turned more to the 
informal sector while women looked to the formal sector for transfer and credit funds.  For men, 
the informal sector’s share of gifts and loans increased from to 76 percent to 84 percent over the 
seven years (Table 13).  This increase in the informal sector came mostly in the form of loans, 
however informal gifts also increased during that time span.  Women, on the other hand, relied 
more heavily on the formal sector, which grew from 45 percent of all gifts and loans to 52 
percent and became the main source of gift and loan money for women.  Most of this increase in 
the formal sector came from the sharp jump in the percentage of households with women 
receiving formal loans (9 percent to 24 percent, Table 13), however the average formal loan 
increased in size as well.  The expansion of the formal sector share of female gifts and loans was 
matched by an equal decline in informal gifts received by women with the informal loan share 
remaining stable.  
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TABLE 13 - Sources of Gifts and Loans Received by Gender and Survey Wave                   
  Wave 1: 1991/92     Wave 2: 1998/99 
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Female                  
Informal  Gifts  8.1  6,074 1259  100.0  50.6    5.7  21,603 2708  100.0  42.5 
                     
Informal Loans  1.2  4,069  1193  100.0  4.9    2.2  6,907  1840  100.0  5.2 
Relative Loans  0.5  3,822  2207  39.9  2.0    1.3  6,523  2086  55.4  2.9 
Non-Relative  Loans  0.7 4,072 805  60.1  3.0    1.1  6,232 2871  43.7  2.3 
                     
Formal Loans  9.3  4,642  149  100.0  44.5    23.6  6,428  208  100.0  52.3 
All Microcredit  9.3  4,642  149  100.0  44.5    23.2  6,405  208  98.0  51.2 
Program Loans  9.1  4,710  144  99.1  44.1    15.7  7,277  268  75.4  39.4 
BRAC 3.4  3,981  223  31.3  13.9    4.8  4,764  275 14.9  7.8 
BRDB 1.9  4,191  239  18.0  8.0    1.0  5,066  314  3.4  1.8 
GB 3.8  5,604  227  49.8  22.1    10.3  8,438  356  57.1  29.8 
Other Microcredit 0.2 1,793 406  0.9  0.4    8.3  4,159 241  22.6  11.8 
Other Formal Loans  0.0  0  0  0.0  0.0    0.5  6,013  1547  2.2  1.1 
Government 0.0  0  0  0.0  0.0    0.1 3,855  174  0.4  0.2 
Non-Government 0.0 0  0  0.0  0.0    0.4  6,247  1913 1.8  0.9 
                      
Male                  
Informal Transfers  7.2  10,061  2633  100.0  46.0    9.1  19,975  2496  100.0  48.9 
                     
Informal Loans  10.7  4,366  414  100.0  29.8    10.9  11,812  2680  100.0  34.7 
Relative Loans  5.3  4,084  540  46.0  13.7    4.6  17,297  5352  61.3  21.2 
Non-Relative  Loans  6.4 3,930 361  54.0  16.1    7.7  6,501 1126  38.7  13.4 
                     
Formal Loans  7.0  5,454  882  100.0  24.2    7.2  8,473  957  100.0  16.4 
All Microcredit  4.3  5,086  265  57.8  14.0    3.9  7,102  491  45.7  7.5 
Program Loans  4.1  5,171  264  55.1  13.4    2.8  8,152  591  37.8  6.2 
BRAC  0.6 4,523 662  7.6  1.8    0.3  7,826 2525  3.3  0.5 
BRDB 2.3  4,789  302  29.5  7.1    0.8  6,530  978  9.0  1.5 
GB 1.1  6,385  589  18.1  4.4    1.7  8,990  774  25.5  4.2 
Other Microcredit 0.3 3,419 936  2.7  0.6    1.1  4,388 916  7.9  1.3 
Other  Formal  Loans  2.7  5,986 2255  42.2  10.2    3.3  10,084 1999  54.0  8.9 
Government 1.2  4,452  460  14.4  3.5    1.7 8,259  780  23.0  3.8 
Non-Government 1.4  7,295 4115  27.7  6.7   1.8  10,618 3193  31.0  5.1 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  Columns may not add up due to rounding.  See text for category definitions. 
1 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (1995 Tk.) that a household received, for households with non-zero values.  Average 1995 Tk./US $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
2 Percentages are calculated based on the total value received (accounting for the percentage of households receiving and average amount received).  
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In real terms, the formal and informal sectors grew for both men and women between 
1991/92 and 1998/99.  Figure 7 shows the increase in informal gifts and loans and formal loans 
received by men and women.  Overall, the average household value of informal gifts and loans 
rose approximately 250 percent for both men and women while the formal loan value increased 
roughly 1.5 times for men and 3.5 times for women (not shown).  Thus there was strong growth 
in both financials sectors for men and women in Bangladesh.  At the same time, there was a large 
decline in informal sector giving and lending for both males and females.  Men gave less than 
half (38 percent) the value of gifts and loans in 1998/99 as they did in 1991/92 while women also 
sent less informal money (73 percent, not shown).  Most of this decline occurred in the form of 
gifts sent as opposed to loans sent by both males and females. 
Within the informal sector, the total value of gifts and loans received from males 
increased substantially.  Gifts and loans from males to other males and from males to females 
grew by over 2.5 times between 1991/92 and 1998/99 (not shown).  Most of this increase can be 
attributed to the significant increases in average gift and loan sizes received from men (Table 
14).  While the percentage of gifts and loans received by men and women remained steady, men 
played a greater role in sending in the informal sector, especially with respect to gifts.  Figure 8 
exhibits the increased male role in the flow of informal gifts.  As females focused more on 
formal sector loans, males became more heavily involved in the informal sector acting as the 





Figure 7. Formal and Informal Gifts and Loans by Survey Wave

































Source: Authors' weighted tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
1 Average values are for both recipient and non-recipient households. 
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TABLE 14 – Informal Gifts and Loans by Sex of Sender and Receiver 
  Wave 1: 1991/92  Wave 2: 1998/99 
   % HH Received Mean
1  Standard Error   % HH Received Mean
1 Standard  Error
Relative Gifts          
 Female-to-Female  2.1%  1,488  587  0.3%  5,463  2488 
 Female-to-Male  0.8%  12,548  8526  0.9%  6,970  1693 
 Male-to-Female  6.8%  6,727  1475  5.5%  22,223  2819 
 Male-to-Male  6.5%  9,564  2704  8.4%  20,679  2660 
Relative Loans          
 Female-to-Female  0.1%  1,437  181  0.3%  3,852  1442 
 Female-to-Male  0.9%  2,923  979  1.1%  6,109  2283 
 Male-to-Female  0.4%  4,240  2704  1.0%  7,036  2593 
 Male-to-Male  4.5%  4,190  595  3.7%  19,558  6398 
Non-Relative Loans          
 Female-to-Female  0.0%  0  0  0.5%  3,598  999 
 Female-to-Male  0.8%  2,914  1070  0.9%  3,685  901 
 Male-to-Female  0.7%  4,072  805  0.4%  11,465  6843 
  Male-to-Male  5.8%  3,958  378  6.4%  6,957  1331 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Weights are used to adjust the choice-based sample to random sample proportions.  The sex of the gift 
or loan source is missing in certain cases.   
1 Mean provides the average cumulative amount (in 1995 Taka) that a household received, for households with non-
zero values.  Average 1995 Tk./U.S. $ exchange rate is 40.278. 
 
 




























































Figure 8. Share of Total Informal Gifts and Loans Received by Sex of Sender and Receiver
Wave 1 vs. Wave 2
Source: Authors' weighted tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh 
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Women saw the largest rise in formal credit between 1991/92 and 1998/99, an increase 
that came almost entirely from microcredit organizations (Figure 9).  Female microcredit loans 
increased significantly both in the average loan amount and the percentage of households 
receiving them.  Nearly a quarter (23 percent) of all households had women receive a loan from a 
microcredit organization in 1998/99 compared with only nine percent in 1991/92 (Table 13).  
The increase was especially large for other microcredit organizations and the Grameen Bank.  
While the bulk of the formal credit increase came from microcredit organizations, women saw a 
slight rise in government and non-government formal loans between waves.  During the first 
wave of the survey, there were no non-microcredit formal loans to women, but in 1998/99 both 
government and non-government institutions sent a few loans to females (though still only 
reaching less than 1 percent of households). 
Men also received more money from formal sources in 1998/99 than they did in 1991/92, 
however the increase was notably smaller for men than for women.  Most of the increase for men 
came from government and non-government institutions.  While the percentage of households 
with men receiving loans from these sources remained relatively steady, the average loan size 
increased significantly (Table 13).  As a result, men doubled the money they received in 
government and non-government loans during the seven-year period (Figure 9).  Male 
microcredit lending remained rather stable between 1991/92 and 1998/99, increasing roughly 25 
percent over that time span.  Overall, males in rural Bangladesh saw an increase in both 
microcredit and non-microcredit formal lending, however this rise was minimal in comparison to 
the increases received by females from formal sources and with the expansion of the male 
informal financial sector. 
Figure 9. Source of Formal Loans Received by Survey Wave























Male Wave 1: 1991/92
Male Wave 2: 1998/99
Female Wave 1: 1991/92
Female Wave 2: 1998/99
Source: Authors' weighted tabulations from the 1991/92 and 1998/99 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh
1 Average values are for both recipient and non-recipient households. 
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Section V.  Regression Results 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
We turn to regressions to begin to investigate whether the formal financial sector crowds 
out the informal financial sector in rural Bangladesh.  This analysis uses the 1991/92 wave of the 
data to estimate the impact of credit from the formal sector, by gender, on informal sector 
behavior.  We use the 1991/92 wave as our starting point because the identification strategy is 
more straightforward than it would be with the later wave.  In the first wave households more 
closely followed the quasi-experimental survey design framework used to identify program 
effects.   Future work on this project will use both survey waves to further analyze the 
relationship between the formal and informal sectors. 
In this analysis, we focus more narrowly on program credit as our measure of formal 
credit for two reasons.  First, as noted, microcredit accounted for 80 percent of all formal loans in 
rural Bangladesh and is essentially the only form of formal credit that women receive.  Second, 
as mentioned in the data section, the survey design enables us to causally identify the impact of 
program credit.  Program credit is defined as the cumulative amount of all loans (greater than or 
equal to 1,000 Taka) received from the three (Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB) credit programs in 
the past six years.   
We focus more narrowly on credit and transfers from relatives as our measure of the 
informal sector.  Relative credit and transfers include cash and the value of all food and other in-
kind assistance sent from (received by) any member of the household to (from) someone living 
away from the household, and all loans made to (received from) relatives over the past year.
19  
We use this slightly narrower definition because informal gifts and loans are predominantly sent 
between relatives.  We also expect relatives to be more altruistically linked and so more likely to 
respond to changes in formal credit received by a household. 
Theory leaves the impact of program credit on credit and transfers from relatives 
unsigned.  Program credit may substitute for transfers and other sources of credit, but they may 
also be complements.  The receipt of program credit could increase borrowing from other 
sources of credit if program credit provides capital that could be used as collateral, or if it signals 
to other lenders that a household is creditworthy. 
Estimation Strategy 
We present estimates below of the impact of program credit on relative credit and 
transfers.  The model we estimate is described in simple terms here by equations (1) and (2).  
The equation for the outcome yij, (e.g., the censored variable of relative credit and transfers 
received for household i in village j), is a function of the amount of program credit the household 
borrows Cij, a vector Xij of household characteristics, (such as land holdings and the age, sex, 
and education of the household head), unknown parameters βy and δ, unmeasured, fixed, village-
                                                 
19 Households that had cumulative informal transfers of less than 100 Taka over the past year were treated as though 
they had zero transfers.  Transfers of less than 100 Taka are too small to be related to microcredit loans, which 
include any loans of over 1,000 Taka, and likely represent a different behavior.  
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level determinants of relative credit and transfers (such as how remote or poor a village is)µ j
y , 
and a nonsystematic error εij
y  reflecting, in part, unmeasured determinants of yij that vary over 
households.   
y y
y ij j ij ij ij C X y ε µ δ β + + + =   (1) 
The reduced form equation (2) measures the amount of program credit borrowed Cij.  
Program credit borrowed is a function of household characteristics Xij and a set of household or 
village characteristics Zij distinct from the Xij's in that they affect Cij but not other household 
behaviors conditional on Cij (see below).  βc and π are unknown parameters,µ j
c  is an unmeasured 
determinant of Cij that is fixed within a village, and εij
c is a nonsystematic error that reflects 
unmeasured determinants that vary over households.   
CX Z ij ij c ij j
c
ij
c =+ + + βπ µ ε   (2) 
The estimation issue arises as a result of the possible correlation ofµ j
c  with µ j
y , and of 
εij
c with εij
y .  Econometric estimation that does not take these correlations into account may yield 
biased estimates of the parameters of equation (1) due to the endogeneity of credit program 
participation Cij.  It may be that unmeasured attributes that affect credit program participation 
also affect the amount of relative credit and transfers that households send and receive.  For 
example, households may self-select into the programs.  The households who choose to join 
microcredit programs may be the ones who have less access to transfers and other sources of 
credit.  Ignoring this self-selection would wrongly ascribe to the credit program the lower 
amount of relative credit and transfers that program participants receive.  It is also likely that 
programs are not randomly placed.  Programs may be placed in poorer or more remote villages 
and households in poorer or more remote villages may send fewer transfers.   
The standard approach to the problem of estimating equations with endogenous 
regressors, such as equation (1), is to use instrumental variables.  In the model set out above, the 
exogenous regressors Zij in equation (2) are the identifying instruments.  Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to find any regressors Zij that can justifiably be used as identifying instrumental 
variables.  Lacking identifying instruments Zij, the sample survey was constructed so as to 
provide identification through a quasi-experimental design.   
To identify the effect of program credit on relative credit and transfers, when program 
credit is endogenous, we must control for the common village- and household-specific 
unobservables and have exogenous variation in our program credit variable.  The approach we 
take is that used by Pitt and Khandker (1998).  We use limited information maximum likelihood 
to jointly estimate the relative credit/transfer and program credit equations, thereby controlling 
for the correlation of the error terms between the two equations.  We use village-level fixed-
effects to remove the source of correlation between program placement and the behavior of 
interest, in this case, informal credit and transfers. 
The exogenous variation necessary to identify the impact of program credit comes from 
the quasi-experimental nature of the program eligibility criteria.  This variation comes from  
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households who were excluded from participating by an exogenous participation rule.  That rule 
is the restriction that households owning more than 0.5 acres of cultivable land are precluded 
from joining any of the three credit programs under study in this analysis.  The half an acre land 
rule acts to exogenously separate households into quasi-experimental treatment and control 
groups.  Owning half an acre of land affects whether a household participates in the credit 
program because it is the arbitrary point chosen for the program rule.  However owning half an 
acre of land should not affect whether a household receives credit or transfers from relatives.  
We would expect landholding to affect transfers and credit from relatives in a more continuous 
manner.    
Households owning slightly more than half an acre of land serve as a control group with 
which to compare households that receive the treatment of program credit.  Identification on the 
basis of land ownership requires that land ownership be exogenous to the population studied, in 
this case, households in rural Bangladesh.  Market sales of land in South Asia are well 
documented to be low.  As a result, land ownership is treated as an exogenous regressor in most 
empirical work on household behavior in South Asia.
20   
Morduch (1998) raises the issue of mistargeting in these data.  There are a number of 
households in our sample that are program participants yet had more than 0.5 acres of land at the 
time of program entry, raising the possibility of mistargeting and potential bias in econometric 
results relying on this targeting rule.  It appears that some of this excess land is either 
uncultivable or marginally so.  Pitt (1999) demonstrates that the value per acre of land owned by 
program participating households who also own more than 0.5 acres of cultivable land at the 
time of joining is a small proportion of the value per acre of the cultivable land of program 
participants owning less than 0.5 acres of cultivable land at the time of joining.  This suggests 
that program officers are using some notion of “effective” units of cultivable land in determining 
eligibility rather than the type of mistargeting that would result in econometric bias.   Pitt (1999) 
discusses this issue at length and demonstrates that treating the exogenous targeting rule as 
greater than 0.5 acres provides a consistent estimator for certain types of mistargeting.  He finds 
that application of targeting rules greater than 0.5 acres (up to 2.0 acres) actually slightly 
strengthens the qualitative results on the effect of credit by gender on household consumption.  
In that paper and in Pitt (2001), results are very insensitive to possible mistargeting.  McKernan 
(2002) also tests the sensitivity of her results to mistargeting.  She finds that two out of the three 
microcredit programs are robust to all mistargeting sensitivity tests and that all three programs 
have large effects on self-employment for the landless poor. 
To illustrate the identification strategy, consider a sample drawn from two villages – 
village 1 does not have the program and village 2 does; and, two types of households, landed 
(Xij=1) and landless (Xij=0).  Innocuously, we assume that landed status is the only observed 
household-specific determinant of relative credit and transfers yij in addition to any treatment 
effect from the program.  The conditional demand equation is: 
                                                 
20 The validity of the assumption that land ownership is exogenous is defended at length in Pitt and Khandker 
(1998).  
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yC X ij ij ij y j
y
ij
y =+ + + δβ µ ε   (3) 
The exogeneity of land ownership is the assumption that E(, ) Xij ij
y ε = 0, that is, that land 
ownership is uncorrelated with the unobserved household-specific effect.  The expected value of 
yij for each household type in each village is: 
E(yij | j=1, Xij=0) = µ1
y   (4a) 
E(yij | j=1, Xij=1) = βy  +µ1
y   (4b) 
E(yij | j=2, Xij=1) = βy  +µ2
y   (4c) 
E(yij | j=2, Xij=0) = C ijδ +µ2
y   (4d) 
where C ij is the mean amount of program credit borrowed among landless households in village 
2 who choose to participate in the program.  It is clear that all the parameters, including the effect 
of the credit program δ, are identified from this design.
21  In particular, the estimator of the 
program effect δ is a variant of the difference-in-differences estimator widely applied in the 
general program evaluation literature.  To see this, note that an estimate of δ is obtained from the 
following difference-in-differences:
22 
[E(yij | j=2, Xij=0) - E(yij | j=2, Xij=1)] - [E(yij | j=1, Xij=0) - E(yij | j=1, Xij=1)]             (4e) 
Even if land ownership is exogenous for the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary that 
the “landless” and the “landed” can be pooled in the estimation.  To enhance the validity of this 
assumption, we restrict the set of nontarget households used in the estimation to those with less 
than five acres of owned land.  In addition, we include the quantity of land owned as one of the 
regressors in the vector Xij and include a dummy variable indicating the target/nontarget status of 
the household. 
The exclusion restrictions that identify the effects of program credit on relative credit and 
transfers yij are the interactions of a dummy variable indicating if the household has the choice to 
join the credit program (which requires meeting the land ownership rule and residing in a village 
with a credit program) and all the exogenous variables of the model, Xij and µj.  Consequently, 
the model is not nonparametrically identified.   
Additional identification restrictions are required when there are both male and female 
credit programs with possibly different effects on behavior.  Identification of gender-specific 
credit is achieved by making use of another quasi-experimental attribute of these programs and 
                                                 
21 Data from nonprogram villages is required for identification if X is a binary indicator of landed status.  If landed 
status is a continuous measure of landholding, then the model is identified without information on behavior in 
nonprogram villages.  That is, (4a) and (4b) are not required.  In this case, the parameter βy in (3) is identified from 
variation in landholding within the program villages (j=2). 
22 However, as Pitt (1999) points out, since this is a quasi-experiment, not an actual experiment, the direct 
application of (4e) would most likely result in a downward biased estimate of δ.  The regression approach applied 
here is quite necessary to control for differences in other observed and unobserved variables across the four groups 
identified in equations (4a) through (4d).  
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the survey.  All program groups are single-sex and not all villages have both a male and a female 
group.  The sample includes some households from villages with only female credit groups, so 
that males in landless households are denied the choice of joining a credit program, and some 
households from villages with only male credit groups, so that landless females are denied 
program choice.  In particular, of the 87 villages in the wave 1 sample, 15 had no credit program, 
40 had credit-groups for both females and males, 22 had female-only groups and 10 had male-
only groups.  The necessary assumption is that the availability of a credit group by gender in a 
village is uncorrelated with the household errors εij
y , conditional on Xij and the village fixed 
effects µj.  As each village had only one type of credit program available, and it is assumed that 
the type of credit program (BRDB, BRAC or Grameen) is uncorrelated with the household errors 
εij
y , conditional on Xij and the village fixed effects µj, there is no need to model which of the 
programs members of a household join.  Controlling for the endogeneity of program credit by 
gender adds an additional equation to the model.  While we’ve described the main model with 
equations (1) and (2), we actually estimate three equations, a trivariate tobit, one equation for 
female program credit, one for male program credit, and one for the outcome, e.g., relative credit 
and transfers received.  
Empirical Results 
Informal credit and transfers from relatives are disaggregated between those received and 
those sent in the estimations reported below.
23  One could construct “net received” as equal to 
credit and transfers received less credit and transfers sent, though using this variable imposes 
restrictions on the parameters on the reduced form determinants of relative credit and transfers 
sent and received.  Constructing net received results in a variable taking both negative and 
positive values with a mass point at zero.  The Tobit model can be generalized to allow a 
dependent variable of this form.  In this preliminary work, we treat relative credit and transfers 
received and relative credit and transfers sent as separate Tobit-like dependent variables.  As 
microcredit is also Tobit-like with a mass at zero, the resulting maximum likelihood procedures 
used is instrumental variables trivariate Tobit.  
Two other aspects of the estimation method are worth noting.  First, the sample design is 
choice-based.  In particular, program participants are purposely over-sampled.  The Weighted 
Exogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) methods of Manski and Lerman (1977) 
were used in the estimation of both parameters and the parameter covariance matrix.  WESML 
estimates are obtained by maximizing a weighted log likelihood function with weights for each 
choice equal to the ratio of the population proportion to the sample proportion for that choice.   
Second, only households in villages that have access to a group-based credit program, 
and meet the (exogenous) eligibility criteria can choose whether to join a credit group and decide 
how much to borrow.  If credit program placement across the villages of Bangladesh is attentive 
to the village effects µj, as Pitt and Khandker (1998) demonstrate, then selection bias will result.  
Estimating village fixed effects sweeps out the village errors correlated with program placement.  
                                                 
23  Due to the limited number of informal female credit and transfers (as reported descriptively), we are unable to 
disaggregate relative credit and transfers by gender.    
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To ease the computational burden, and because the number of households reporting transfers and 
credit from relatives in each village is relatively small (and sometimes zero), we use thana fixed 
effects in the conditional relative credit/transfer equations.  There are three villages, all with the 
same type of credit program, in each of the 24 program thanas.   
Table 15 presents estimates of the impact of the log of program credit on the log of 
relative credit and transfers received.  Column (1) presents estimates of program effects 
disaggregated by program (BRAC, BRDB and Grameen Bank) and by gender.
24  The only 
statistically significant parameter among the six program parameters is for female borrowing 
from the Grameen Bank.  Test statistics at the bottom of the column reveal that all three 
microcredit programs do not have different effects for female or male participants, but there is 
some evidence that female programs effects differ from male program effects.  In column (2), we 
impose the restriction that program effects are the same across program types for each gender.  
The equality of the female and male program effect is rejected (χ
2 = 4.94, p=0.03).  Tests of the 
exogeneity of female and male credit in the determination of relative credit and transfers 
received are t-tests of the associated error correlation coefficients ρ.  Neither ρ in column (2) is 
statistically different from zero at common levels of significance.  Consequently, in column (3) 
we present the preferred estimates that impose both exogeneity and equal affects across program 
types.  In column (3), there is strong evidence that program credit provided women over the past 
six years is a substitute for the receipt of relative credit and transfers, but no evidence that this is 
the case for borrowing by men.  The latent elasticity of relative credit and transfers received with 
respect to female program credit is -0.162 (t=3.599).  Program credit provided to women results 
in a decrease in relative credit and transfers received from relatives.   
The impact of program credit on credit and transfers sent to relatives is presented in 
Table 16.  In column (1), with disaggregated programs by gender, there seem to be strong and 
positive effects of male program credit on the sending of credit and transfers to family relations.  
The tests at the bottom of the table reveal that, for both men and women, program type does not 
matter.  Column (2) aggregates the three program types into one for each gender.  In column (2), 
a test of the null hypothesis that women’s program credit is exogenous in the determination of 
credit and transfers from relatives sent cannot be rejected (ρ=0.056, t=0.397), but the analogous 
test for male program credit yields a rejection (ρ=-0.273, t=-2.622).  The negative ρ for men 
suggests that men who tend to borrow from these microcredit programs tend to send fewer gifts 
and loans than nonborrowers, conditional on the regressors.  The point estimate of the ρ for 
males in the relative credit and transfers received conditional demand equation is also negative, 
although not statistically different from zero (ρ=-0.161, t=-1.217), suggesting that men who join 
these credit program engage in less informal credit and transfer behavior than program 
nonparticipators.  This is consistent with the descriptive findings suggesting that households who 
engage in formal transfer behavior are less likely to engage in informal transfer behavior.  There 
is no noticeable pattern in these unobservables among women. 
                                                 
24  The full set of coefficients are presented and briefly discussed in the Appendix.    
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TABLE 15 – Estimates of the Impact of Log Program Credit on Log Relative Credit and Transfers Received 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
  
By gender and program: 
all endogenous 
(1) 
By gender:  
all endogenous 
(2) 
By gender:  
exogeneity imposed
(3) 
-0.168     Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC 
(-1.472)    
      
0.095     Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC 
(0.760)    
      
-0.189     Log of amount borrowed by female from BRDB 
(-1.588)    
      
0.022     Log of amount borrowed by male from BRDB 
(0.208)    
      
-0.321     Log of amount borrowed by female from GB 
(-2.734)    
      
0.198     Log of amount borrowed by male from GB 
(1.342)    
      
 -0.225  -0.162  Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC, BRDB, or 
GB 
 (-2.252)  (-3.599) 
      
 0.101  0.011  Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC, BRDB, or 
GB 
 (0.991)  (0.226) 
      
0.121 0.120  0  ρ (women) 
(0.780) (0.782)   
      
-0.130 -0.161  0  ρ (men) 
(-0.978) (-1.217)   
      
Number of observation  1726  1726  1726 
      
7.55 4.94  6.45  Wald test (χ2) statistic for:  
Equality of programs effects across genders:   
p=0.06 p=0.03  p=0.01 
      
2.29     Equality of effects across programs (females)  
p=0.32    
      
2.14     Equality of effects across programs (males) 
p=0.34       
Source: Authors’ weighted regressions from the 1991/92 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios.  Presents only selected regressors. 
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TABLE 16 – Estimates of the Impact of Log Program Credit on Log Relative Credit and Transfers Sent 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
  












0.074     Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC 
(0.788)    
     
0.247     Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC 
(2.401)    
     
-0.074     Log of amount borrowed by female from BRDB 
(-0.581)    
     
0.334     Log of amount borrowed by male from BRDB 
(3.117)    
     
-0.060     Log of amount borrowed by female from GB 
(-0.528)    
     
0.305     Log of amount borrowed by male from GB 
(2.698)    
     
 0.029  0.056  Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC, BRDB, 
or GB 
 (0.325)  (1.187) 
     
 0.291  0.290  Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC, BRDB, or 
GB 
 (3.572)  (3.546) 
     
0.075 0.056  0  ρ (women) 
(0.550) (0.397)   
     
-0.281 -0.273 -0.272  ρ (men) 
(-2.621) (-2.622)  (-2.6042) 
     
Number  of  observation  1726 1726 1726 
     
8.23 4.79 6.51  Wald test (χ2) statistic for:  
Equality of programs effects across genders:   
p=0.04 p=0.03 p=0.01 
     
2.30     Equality of effects across programs (females)  
p=0.32    
     
0.63     Equality of effects across programs (males) 
p=0.73       
Source: Authors’ weighted regressions from the 1991/92 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh. 
General Notes: Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios.  Presents only selected regressors. 
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  In column (3) of Table 16 we present the preferred estimates which impose exogeneity 
where warranted and equality of treatment effects by program. The latent elasticity of relative 
credit and transfers sent with respect to program credit is 0.056 (t=1.187) for women and 0.290 
(t=3.546) for men.  After controlling for the endogeneity of program credit—men who tend to 
borrow from these microcredit programs tend to send fewer gifts and loans than nonborrowers—
program credit provided men results in an increase in informal gifts and loans sent.   
To interpret our results we calculate approximate marginal effects based on the latent 
elasticities and take the difference between the marginal effect of relative credit and transfers 
received and relative credit and transfers sent.  We find that for households eligible to participate 
in microcredit programs, a 100 Taka increase in female program credit reduces net relative credit 
and transfers into the household by 25 Taka, and a 100 Taka increase in male program credit 
reduces net relative credit and transfers into the household by 31 Taka.  Taking the results of 
Tables 15 and 16 together, we find that program borrowing by males and females results in a 
decrease in net relative credit and transfers received in the household because households receive 
fewer gifts and loans from relatives when a female borrows and send more gifts and loans to 
relatives when a male borrows.   
Our finding that female program credit reduces credit and transfers received from 
relatives and male program credit increases credit and transfers sent to relatives, made perfect 
sense to the Grameen Bank official we discussed it with.  He explained that transfers in 
Bangladesh typically go from males, the income earners, to females, and specifically from sons 
to parents.  An increase in program credit to a female would reduce transfers to that household 
for two reasons:  (1) the household would have more income and so need fewer transfers; and (2) 
children might backlash against a female who expresses an interest in being more independent by 
taking out a Grameen Bank loan.  An increase in program credit to a male would increase 
transfers sent because that male would have more income to remit.   
Our findings from the literature and our descriptive results help corroborate the Grameen 
Bank official’s explanation.  An increase in program credit will have potential income effects—
the household will have more income to spend and send as credit and transfers.  An increase in 
program credit to women is more likely to result in increases in spending on education and food 
(maternal altruism) and no increase in credit and transfers sent because women in Bangladesh 
rarely send credit or transfers.  An increase in program credit to men, on the other hand, is more 
likely to result in increases in credit and transfers sent, because men do send gifts and loans, 
typically to a father or widowed mother.   
We can also infer from the literature, that an increase in program credit may crowd out 
income from informal transfers, if transfers are altruistically motivated.  Our finding that 
informal transfers typically flow to poorer households is consistent with altruistic motives for 
sending transfers.  Indeed, we do find that an increase in program credit to women reduces 
transfers received.  An increase in program credit to men does not reduce transfers received 
because the younger men that typically receive program credit (37 year olds on average, Table 6) 
do not typically receive informal transfers.  Older men (55 year olds on average, Table 6) are  
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more likely to receive informal transfers, perhaps from their sons participating in microcredit 
programs.  We also know from the literature that microcredit programs are associated with 
increased empowerment for women.  Participating in a microcredit program could cause male 
sons to backlash against a mother who is violating purdah by going into public places to meet 
with male program staff and fellow female members, among other activities. 
In summary, this preliminary causal model suggests that program credit and net credit 
and transfers from relatives are substitutes.  Consequently the benefits of microcredit program 
borrowing seem to be shared by family relations through a change in net flows received by them.  
Future research will use both waves of the panel to measure crowding out.   
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Section VI.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In 1998/99, rural Bangladesh appears to have had both prosperous formal and informal 
financial sectors.  Roughly half of all households received a gift or loan from one or both sectors 
during the past year.  The value of gifts alone amounted to nearly half of total household income, 
suggesting that these transfers are an important income source for the households that receive 
them.  The demographic characteristics of households that did and did not receive a gift or loan 
were surprisingly similar, but some differences among recipients are evident.  Households 
receiving informal loans had higher incomes on average, while households receiving informal 
gifts had lower incomes on average, and were more likely to be female headed and older.  The 
reliance on the formal and informal sectors seems to have been relatively split with an informal 
sector that was at least as important as the formal sector.   
Gifts and loans in the informal sector were predominantly sent between relatives and 
came most often in the form of cash (as opposed to in-kind).  However, non-relatives still made 
up an important component of informal lending. Similar to findings in previous literature, 
households in rural Bangladesh received more than they sent through the informal financial 
sector.  This is largely because households in our rural sample received the majority of their 
informal gifts in the form of remittances from abroad and transfers from urban areas.   
While the informal sector was greater in total value than the formal sector, lenders in the 
formal sector were able to reach more households.  The formal sector was dominated by 
microcredit organizations that accounted for 83 percent of formal loans.  Today Bangladesh has 
the largest operation of microcredit programs in the world, with about 12.4 million active 
borrowers and over 629 NGOs engaged in microcredit (World Bank 2003, 21). These institutions 
sent relatively small loans in comparison with both non-microcredit loans and informal sector 
transactions, but they reached over a quarter of all households in rural Bangladesh in 1998/99. 
A major finding of this analysis is the large difference between men and women in whom 
they depend upon to provide financial services.  While women are relatively split between their 
reliance on the formal and informal financial sectors, men rely much more heavily on informal 
credit and transfers.  The evidence points to an informal sector that is much less oriented to 
women than would be expected given previous results from other studies.  In fact, the majority of 
informal gifts and loans flow between men in rural Bangladesh.  Though some of this may be 
due to reporting, even reclassifying the gender of the recipient to correspond with the 
relationship to the sender does little to alter this finding.  Data from the survey show that men 
received the majority of all informal gifts and over two-thirds of all informal loans.  Men sent 95 
percent of all gifts and loans.  Men, typically older, primarily receive informal gifts from their 
children, siblings, and more distant relatives.  While women typically receive informal gifts from 
spouses who are remitting from abroad or children.  Overall, males relied on the informal sector  
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for roughly 85 percent of all the gifts and loans they received, leaving only a limited role for the 
male formal sector. 
Microcredit was a key source of money for women in rural Bangladesh, accounting for 
roughly half of all gifts and loans received by women and effectively acting as the only source of 
formal lending to women.  While the total value of gifts and loans received from the formal and 
informal sectors was nearly equal for women, microcredit organizations reached nearly three 
times as many women as the informal sector.  In comparison, only seven percent of women 
received an informal gift or loan during the past year, though these gifts were large—averaging 
roughly three times the size of both formal and informal loans.  It appears that the female 
informal sector was mostly limited to informal transfers sent to widowed women or women 
whose spouses were temporarily away.  As a result, informal credit comprised only 11 percent of 
the female informal sector, a sharp contrast to the 42 percent share for males. 
The results show many different variations on the recipients of formal and informal 
finance, including similarities among the groups.  However a few rough generalizations can be 
made: 
•  Informal transfer recipients in rural Bangladesh are typically: 
1.  Older married men receiving transfers from their children or siblings; 
2.  Relatively poor widowed women receiving transfers from their children; 
3. Relatively poor married women receiving transfers from spouses who are 
temporarily away from the household. 
•  Informal transfer senders in rural Bangladesh are typically: 
1.  Male children, male spouses temporarily away from the household, and male 
siblings. 
•  Informal credit recipients in rural Bangladesh are typically: 
1.  Relatively wealthy men receiving loans from siblings, in-laws, and other more 
distant relatives; 
2.  Relatively wealthy men receiving loans from neighbors, friends, and other non-
relatives (employers, landlords, shopkeepers, …). 
•  Formal credit recipients in rural Bangladesh are typically: 
1.  Women receiving loans from microcredit programs 
Between 1991/92 and 1998/99, there was a substantial expansion of the formal and 
informal financial sectors in Bangladesh.  During the seven-year period, the total value of 
informal gifts and formal and informal loans received grew by over 250 percent and the  
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percentage of households receiving a gift or loan increased from 37 percent to 49 percent.   
Formal transfers increased 80 percent.   
Though the growth was nearly equal in magnitude for both financial sectors, there were 
significant differences in the two expansions.  Almost the entire increase in the informal sector 
can be ascribed to rises in loan sizes.  Formal sector growth, on the other hand, was primarily led 
by a rise in the number of households receiving loans. Additionally, the expansions varied 
greatly by gender as women realized the majority of growth in the formal sector while males 
received slightly more of the informal sector expansion.  Finally, while the value of informal 
gifts and loans received grew immensely, there was a drop in the value of informal credit and 
transfers sent.  These changes occurred in the context of and can largely be explained by 
substantial economic growth, a large increase in microcredit programs, and a massive flood 
between the time periods. 
Though men still receive a significantly larger amount of the credit and transfer money 
than women, the gap narrowed significantly during the 1990’s.  Overall, women saw a 300 
percent growth in the formal and informal sectors, outpacing the 235 percent increase enjoyed by 
men.  While almost all of the gain for men came through increases in gift and loan sizes, there 
was a considerable rise in the total percentage of women receiving gifts and loans (12 percentage 
points compared to one percentage point for men).  In fact, in 1998/99, more households had 
females who received a gift or loan in the past year than had males who received them. 
Evidence on the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is mixed.  Even 
though nearly half of all households received a gift or loan in the past year, households in rural 
Bangladesh rarely received them from both the formal and informal sectors.  Only 12 percent of 
households involved in the formal or informal sectors received money from both. Though the 
data clearly show that the majority of households do not rely on both sectors for credit and 
transfers, the reason for this behavior is not as clear. The descriptive evidence appears to show 
that formal credit is mostly reaching households who otherwise would not have access to the 
informal sector or who choose not to move from the corner of no informal sector use.  However 
the descriptive results also show similarities between households receiving formal credit and 
informal credit and transfers (e.g., many come from the same income quintiles) suggesting that 
there is substantial overlap between these populations and thus potential for crowding out.  The 
descriptive results also highlight that informal transfer recipients are slightly lower-income than 
non-recipients, suggesting that transfers may in part be altruistically motivated.  
The regressions results suggest that the formal sector is partially crowding out the 
informal sector.  We find that program borrowing by males and females results in a decrease in 
net credit and transfers from relatives received in the household because households receive 
fewer credit and transfers when a female borrows and send more credit and transfers when a 
male borrows.  The descriptive differences that we do find between the types of households 
receiving formal credit and informal transfers help paint a potential story for our regression 
results.  An increase in program credit to women results in fewer transfers to the household as 
male children and spouses temporarily away from the household send fewer transfers.  The  
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children and spouses send fewer transfers in response to the women’s increased income (from 
the income from the milking cow a woman might purchase with the microcredit loan, for 
example) and in response to the potential shame women bring to the family by violating aspects 
of purdah in order to participate in microcredit programs.  An increase in program credit to men 
results in increased transfers sent from the household as the men have more income (from 
driving the rickshaw they purchased with their microcredit loan, for example) to send to older 
fathers, widowed mothers, or siblings. 
Policy Implications 
With slightly more than half of all households and many poor households still receiving 
no gift or loan in the past year, there is plenty of room for growth in the financial sectors in the 
near future.  Formal sector financial programs are one way to provide this growth. 
However, the finding that the formal sector may partially crowd out the informal sector 
has important policy implications.  First, the effects of public programs on beneficiaries may be 
less than originally intended, especially if the measure of welfare is restricted to income.  Some 
of the benefits will be shared with third parties—those who send and receive informal transfers 
and credit.  Second, as a result of the shared benefits, there are likely to be unmeasured third 
party impacts of new credit or transfer programs that are not being captured in existing impact 
measures.  It is most likely that many of these third party impacts are positive.  The programs 
will improve the welfare not just of program participants but of related non-participants.   We 
find that microcredit recipients increase their transfer activity as a consequence of a loan.  The 
recipient of that net transfer is likely to be another poor household since in a stratified society 
like Bangladesh, the landless poor are very unlikely to have "rich uncles."  A consequence of 
ignoring third-party effects is an underestimate of program effects, and this underestimate can be 
large.   
The gender-specific findings also have important policy implications.  Evidence suggests 
that finances in the hands of women result in higher repayment rates, empowerment, and better 
outcomes—such as improved health and nutrition for both boys and girls.  It is important for 
formal sector programs to target women in countries such as Bangladesh where few women 
receive gifts or loans from the informal sector.  Microcredit programs have been successful in 
reaching women.  As a result, women receive more loans from those organizations than men.   
Our preliminary evidence indicates that all finances targeted to women will not 
necessarily remain in the hands of women.  Formal loans to women reduce net transfers into the 
household.  As men primarily send transfers, they may receive some of the benefits of female 
program participation.  For example, the male children and spouses of female program 
participants will need to transfer less because the women now has her own source of income.  
Even though some of the income from female-targeted programs may be shared with men, 
programs targeting women are likely to shift financial resources and power within the household 
toward women.  Similarly, formal finances targeted to men will not necessarily remain in the 
targeted household.  Formal loans to men increase transfers sent out of the household.  For  
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example, fathers and siblings may receive some of the increased income from programs.  These 
third parties (the fathers, siblings, children, and spouses, among others) and measures of their 
gender will need to be captured in order to assess the complete gender impacts of gender-
targeted programs. 
The few studies that have examined crowding out find only partial crowding out.  Formal 
programs still provide the majority of benefits to their targeted populations.  Additional research 
is necessary to better quantify the relationship between the formal and informal sectors by 
gender.  Policymakers interested in targeting and program impacts should consider gender 
differences and the relationship between the formal and informal sectors.  
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Regression Results:  Full Sets of Coefficients 
The coefficients from the three equation systems used to estimate the impact of program 
credit on interhousehold transfers received and sent are shown in Tables A1 and A2.  The 
determinants of program credit given to women, program credit given to men, and 
interhousehold transfers conditional on program credit are shown in columns (1), (2), and (3) 
respectively.  We estimate these three tobit equations jointly using limited information maximum 
likelihood in order to control for the correlation of the error terms between the credit and transfer 
equations.  While the program credit coefficients are of primary interest and discussed in the 
text, we show the full set of coefficients here to give a better sense of the control variables. 
The reduced form determinants of program credit (Tables A1 and A2, columns 1 and 2) 
show that variables measuring potential sources of interhousehold transfers are generally not 
significant determinants of the amount of program credit received by either men or women.  
Only the number of brothers of the household head who own land significantly affect the amount 
of credit men receive.  The gender and age of the household head have opposite effects on 
expected credit for men and women. Having a male household head decreases the expected 
credit amount received by women and increases the expected credit amount received by men.  
While having an older household head increases expected credit for women but decreases it for 
men.  Program credit increases with land holdings for men, but not for women.  Education has no 
statistically significant effect on credit amounts for either men or women.  Having no spouse 
present in the household decreases expected credit for women but has no statistically significant 
effect on men. 
The reduced form determinants of interhousehold transfers received (Table A1, column 
3) present some further evidence on differences between households that do and do not receive 
interhousehold transfers, but less than one might hope because the reduced form determinants are 
conditioned on program credit, our primary variable of interest.  Thus the coefficient on the 
education of the household head, for example, tells us the effect of education on interhousehold 
transfers while holding constant program credit.  We find that potential sources of interhousehold 
transfers, while not individually significant, are likely jointly significant.  We also find that the 
older the household head and the more educated males are in the household, the more likely the 
household is to receive interhousehold transfers even after conditioning on program credit.  The 
coefficients on the amount of program credit received are discussed in the text.   
The reduced form determinants of interhousehold transfers sent (Table A2, column 3) 
indicate that, holding program credit constant, households send fewer transfers if brothers of the 
household head own land.  This suggests that households with wealthy relatives may be less 
likely to send transfers (possibly because their relatives are wealthier and in turn need transfers 
less).  Less expected, male-headed households are less likely to send transfers than female- 
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headed households and older household heads are more likely to send transfers, after 
conditioning on program credit.  Households with more educated women are more likely to send 
transfers, as are households without women present, holding credit constant.  Households 
without a spouse present are less likely to send transfers than households with a spouse present, 
holding credit constant.  Finally, non-target households (households owning more than half an 
acre of land and thus presumably wealthier) are more likely to send transfers than non-target 
households, holding credit constant.  The coefficients on the amount of program credit received 
are discussed in the text.    
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TABLE A1 – Estimates of the Impact of Log Program Credit on Log Relative Credit and Transfers Received
3 Equation System - Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Log Female Credit 
Borrowed 
(1)   
Log Male Credit 
Borrowed 




   Estimate 
Asymptotic 
t-ratio   Estimate 
Asymptotic  
t-ratio     Estimate 
Asymptotic 
t-ratio 
Number of sisters of spouse who own land  -0.057 (-0.584)  0.072  (0.634)    0.047  (0.318) 
                                              
Number of brothers of spouse who own land  0.032 (0.409)  0.060 (0.591)    0.081 (0.663) 
                                              
Number of parents of spouse who own land  -0.138 (-0.93)  0.124 (0.660)    -0.084 (-.376) 
                                              
Number of sisters of head who own land  0.041 (0.436)  -0.010 (-.092)    0.250 (1.730) 
                                              
Number of brothers of head who own land  0.048 (0.530)  0.233 (2.051)    0.264 (1.865) 
                                              
Number of parents of head who own land  0.052 (0.287)  0.246 (1.084)    0.072 (0.250) 
                                              
Log of total household land assets (in decimals)  0.046 (0.895)  0.159 (2.310)    0.031 (0.347) 
                                              
Highest grade completed by head        -0.033 (-.498)  -0.045 (-.501)    0.040 (0.496) 
                                              
Male household head                    -1.357 (-2.450)  1.604  (1.994)    -2.384 (-3.796) 
                                              
Age of household head (in years)                       0.017 (2.199)  -0.018  (-1.673)    0.029 (2.466) 
                                              
Maximum educational attainment of females  -0.065 (-1.363)  -0.056  (-.884)    0.032  (0.464) 
                                              
Maximum educational attainment of males  0.024 (0.387)  0.133 (1.598)    0.164 (2.079) 
                                              
No adult male in household     -0.564 (-.914)        -0.263 (-.311) 
                                              
No adult female in household        -0.968  (-1.044)    1.884  (1.670) 
                                              
No spouse present in household          -0.913 (-2.577)  -0.644 (-1.275)    0.885  (1.678) 
                                       
Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC          -0.168  (-1.472) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC          0.095  (0.760) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by female from BRDB          -0.189  (-1.588) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from BRDB          0.022  (0.208) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by female from GB          -0.321  (-2.734) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from GB          0.198  (1.342) 
                                       
Non-target household          -0.632  (-1.352) 
             
sigma (female credit)          2.225  (33.822) 
             
sigma (male credit)          2.437  (26.994) 
             
sigma (transfers)          2.997  (21.087) 
             
ρ (female credit/transfers)          0.121  (0.780) 
             
ρ (male credit/transfers)                   -0.130  (-.978) 
Source: Authors’ weighted regressions from the 1991/92 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh.       
General Notes: All three equations include village level fixed effect dummies.  Individuals are considered adults at age 16. 
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TABLE A2 – Estimates of the Impact of Log Program Credit on Log Relative Credit and Transfers Sent 
3 Equation System - Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Log Female Credit 
Borrowed 
(1)   
Log Male Credit 
Borrowed 




   Estimate 
Asymptotic 
t-ratio   Estimate 
Asymptotic  
t-ratio     Estimate 
Asymptotic 
t-ratio 
Number of sisters of spouse who own land  -0.064 (-.659)  0.076 (0.671)    0.124 (0.930) 
                                              
Number of brothers of spouse who own land  0.037 (0.472)  0.041 (0.414)    0.211 (1.498) 
                                              
Number of parents of spouse who own land  -0.158 (-1.072)  0.171  (0.916)    -0.183 (-0.664) 
                                              
Number of sisters of head who own land  0.045 (0.493)  0.009 (0.091)    0.172 (1.068) 
                                              
Number of brothers of head who own land  0.039 (0.442)  0.264 (2.361)    -0.743  (-4.264) 
                                              
Number of parents of head who own land  0.049 (0.269)  0.287 (1.253)    -0.255  (-0.632) 
                                              
Log of total household land assets (in decimals)  0.046 (0.893)  0.142 (2.063)    0.021 (0.172) 
                                              
Highest grade completed by head        -0.026 (-0.385)  -0.063 (-0.710)    0.164  (1.660) 
                                              
Male household head                    -1.440 (-2.572)  1.676  (2.056)    -2.536 (-2.575) 
                                              
Age of household head (in years)                       0.017 (2.188)  -0.020  (-1.834)    0.029 (1.952) 
                                              
Maximum educational attainment of females  -0.060 (-1.307)  -0.058 (-0.943)    0.176  (2.233) 
                                              
Maximum educational attainment of males  0.020 (0.317)  0.145 (1.767)    -0.057  (-0.634) 
                                              
No adult male in household     -0.629 (-0.980)        0.450  (0.401) 
                                              
No adult female in household        -0.932  (-1.019)    4.104  (3.129) 
                                              
No spouse present in household          -0.948 (-2.687)  -0.623 (-1.210)    -1.754 (-2.238) 
                                       
Log of amount borrowed by female from BRAC          0.074  (0.788) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from BRAC          0.247  (2.401) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by female from BRDB          -0.074  (-0.581) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from BRDB          0.334  (3.117) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by female from GB          -0.060  (-0.528) 
             
Log of amount borrowed by male from GB          0.305  (2.698) 
                                       
Non-target household          2.502  (4.632) 
             
sigma (female credit)          2.224  (33.721) 
             
sigma (male credit)          2.432  (26.831) 
             
sigma (transfers)          2.661  (13.248) 
             
ρ (female credit/transfers)          0.075  (0.550) 
             
ρ (male credit/transfers)                   -0.281  (-2.621) 
Source: Authors’ weighted regressions from the 1991/92 World Bank/BIDS survey of rural Bangladesh.       
General Notes: All three equations include village level fixed effect dummies.  Individuals are considered adults at age 16. 
 